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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
ADMIRALTY - RESPONSIBILITY FOR MAINTENANCE AND CURE PAY-
MENTS ESTABLISHED BETWEEN COEXTENSIVELY LIABLE SHIPOWNERS.
Gooden v. Sinclair Ref. Co. (3d Cir. 1967)
Seaman Gooden, through no fault of his own, injured his back while
employed on one of Texaco's ships. Before reaching the point of maximum
cure, Gooden was subsequently employed on a ship owned by Sinclair.
As a result of this employment, his back injury was "heightened," through
no fault of Gooden or Sinclair. In his suit against Sinclair for maintenance
and cure,1 the district court ruled in Gooden's favor and also held im-
pleaded defendant, Texaco, liable over to Sinclair for all of these payments.2
On appeal, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, per Judge Seitz, vacated
and remanded,3 holding that where two or more shipowners' obligations to
make maintenance and cure payments are coextensive, and none of them
are at fault for the seaman's injury or illness, in the absence of a release,
the shipowners must share the payments equally. However, if the prior
shipowner was at fault in causing the seaman's initial injury, the later ship-
owner is entitled to full indemnification from the prior shipowner for all
coextensive maintenance and cure payments made to the seaman.4 Gooden
v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 378 F.2d 576 (3d Cir. 1967).
The coextensive liability of the parties in Gooden was based on firmly
embedded rules of admiralty law. When a seaman is injured or becomes
ill while under articles, the shipowner is liable for his maintenance and
cure 5 up to the point of his maximum cure,6 regardless of subsequent
employment 7 or origin of the injury or illness.8 Thus, both Texaco and
1. The maintenance and cure claim covered the period between the "heightening"
of the injury on Sinclair's ship and the time of trial.
2. Gooden v. Texaco, Inc., 255 F. Supp. 343 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
3. Remand was necessary because the district court did not determine whether
Gooden's initial back injury was caused by a violation of any duty owed to him
by Texaco.
4. See Gore v. Clearwater Shipping Corp., 378 F.2d 584 (3d Cir. 1967).
5. Maintenance and cure includes lost wages and out-of-pocket expenses in
payment of room and board and medical costs.
6. Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 531 (1962); Farrell v. United States,
336 U.S. 511, 518 (1949); Rowald v. Cargo Carriers, Inc., 243 F. Supp. 629, 632
(E.D. Mo. 1965).
7. Wilson v. United States, 229 F.2d 277, 280 (2d Cir. 1956) ; Yates v. Dann,
223 F.2d 64, 67 (3d Cir. 1955) ; Loverich v. Warner Co., 118 F.2d 690, 693 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 313 U.S. 577 (1941); Pyles v. American Trading & Prod. Corp., 244
F. Supp. 685, 687 (S.D. Texas 1965).
8. Farrell v. United States, 336 U.S. 511, 515-16 (1949) ; Calmar S.S. Corp. v.
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Sinclair were coextensively liable for maintenance and cure payments
covering the period after Gooden's back injury was "heightened" on Sin-
clair's ship. Texaco's liability had not ended because Gooden had not
reached maximum cure prior to the subsequent aggravation of his injury.
Sinclair's liability arose simply because Gooden was employed on its ship
at the time his back injury was "heightened."
The Gooden court concluded that if Texaco was not at fault in causing
Gooden's back injury, then equitable considerations would demand that
Texaco and Sinclair share their coextensive maintenance and cure obliga-
tions.9 In support of this conclusion, the court relied on Vaughan v.
Atkinson ° which stated that "[E]quity is no stranger in admiralty;
admiralty courts are, indeed, authorized to grant equitable relief."" Con-
ceivably, the court could have relied on the analogous tort concept of
contribution in cases involving concurrent tortfeasors acting independently
and unintentionally in causing a single indivisible injury.' 2 Both Texaco
and Sinclair were, like concurrent tortfeasors, jointly and severally liable
to a third party for the same claim. The probable rationale underlying
contribution in the concurrent tortfeasor situation is that:
There is obvious lack of sense and justice in a rule which permits the
entire burden of a loss, for which two defendants were equally, unin-
tentionally responsible, to be shouldered onto one alone, according to
the accident of a successful levy of execution ... [or] plaintiff's whim
or spite, . . .while the latter goes scott free.
13
Accordingly, the Gooden court had sound equitable justification for re-
solving the issue of contribution as it did.
The court was also confronted with resolving the liability of Texaco
to Sinclair if, on remand,14 the district court concluded that Texaco was
at fault in causing Gooden's back injury. It reached its indemnification
holding by applying the admiralty principle which requires a prior negligent
shipowner to respond primarily for damages,15 and a subsequent non-
11,641) (C.C.D. Mass. 1832). However, a shipowner is not liable when the injury
or illness is caused by the seaman's gross or willful misconduct or when the condition
existed at the time the seaman signed on the ship and was knowingly concealed by
him. Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724, 732 (1943) ; The Osceola, 189 U.S.
158, 169 (1903); Harden v. Gordon, 11 F. Cas. 480, 482 (No. 6,047) (C.C.D.
Me. 1823).
9. There is no legal case law precedent for the "equal share" doctrine espoused
by the court. There is, however, an analogous situation in which two ships, equally at
fault in causing a collision, must equally share the aggregate resulting damages. See
G. GILMOR9 & C. BLACK, THg LAW OF ADMIRALTY § 7-4, at 402 (1957).
10. 369 U.S. 527 (1962).
11. Id. at 530. See also Vega v. The Malula, 291 F.2d 415, 416 (5th Cir. 1961)
Diddlebock v. Alcoa S.S. Co., 234 F. Supp. 811, 814 (E.D. Pa. 1964) ; Esso Standard
v. The Arosa Sun, 184 F. Supp. 124, 127 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
12. See generally W. PROSSR, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 44 at 265-66
& § 47 (3d ed. 1964).
13. Id. § 47, at 275.
14. See note 3 supra.
15. Damages in such cases invariably include all the maintenance and cure
expenses of the seaman.
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negligent shipowner to respond secondarily for maintenance and cure
payments, when the injured seaman sues both shipowners jointly. 16 The
avowed purpose of the court was to insure that the ultimate liability
remained the same regardless of the seaman's arbitrary choice to proceed
against either shipowner to satisfy his claim for maintenance and cure. The
cogency of this argument is compelling, and since an admiralty court may
choose to apply equitable principles, 17 its adoption is difficult to criticize.
In arriving at its decision to allow indemnity, the court was faced
with the problem of distinguishing two cases which appeared to contravene
its indemnification result. A close examination of these cases, however,
indicates that they are not on point, and therefore caused the court un-
necessary concern. Crab Orchard Improvement Co. v. Chesapeake & 0.
Ry.' 8 concerned a West Virginia workman's compensation statute. There
the court held that an employer who discharges his duty to make work-
man's compensation payments to an employee injured by a third-party
tortfeasor may not seek indemnity from that third party for such pay-
ments absent a violation of a contractual or legal duty owed by the tort-
feasor to the employer. While this case, by analogy, would appear to
militate against the instant court's indemnification holding, it is not apposite
since the Crab Orchard court was primarily interested in preventing double
liability from being imposed upon the third party tortfeasor. 19 The Federal
No. 220 involved a shipowner's indemnity claim for maintenance and cure
payments made to a seaman injured by a third-party's negligence. In that
case indemnification was again denied. But, this case cannot be compared
with the indemnification situation considered by the Gooden court since
denial of indemnification in Federal No. 2 was predicated on the court's
finding that a causal connection did not exist between the tortfeasor's
negligence and the maintenance and cure payments made by the non-
negligent shipowner. The court reasoned that the cause of the non-negligent
shipowner's duty to pay was his contractual obligation to the injured sea-
man; the negligent conduct of the third party was but the "remote occasion"
that precipitated the contingency that the contract contemplated.
21
16. Mystic Terminal Co. v. Thibeault, 108 F.2d 813, 814-15 (1st Cir. 1940)
The Jefferson Myers, 45 F.2d 162 (2d Cir. 1930); Seely v. City of New York, 24
F.2d 412, 412-13 (2d Cir. 1928); Gomes v. Eastern Gas & Fuel Associates, 127 F.
Supp. 435, 438 (D. Mass. 1954). The seaman, however, cannot have both damages
and maintenance and cure if the result would be a duplication of recovery. Barthol-
omew v. Universe Tankships, Inc., 279 F.2d 911, 913 (2d Cir. 1960) ; Muise v. Abbott,
160 F.2d 590, 592 (1st Cir. 1947); Smith v. Lykes Bros.-Ripley S.S. Co., 105 F.2d
604, 606 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 604 (1939).
17. See cases cited supra note 11.
18. 115 F.2d 277 (4th Cir. 1940).
19. Such dual liability was possible under the West Virginia compensation statute
in question. That possibility will not exist in the instant case if it is determined that
Texaco was at fault. See p. 190 & note 25 infra.
20. 21 F.2d 313 (2d Cir. 1927).
21. Id. at 314. Although The Federal No. 2 can be distinguished from the instant
case on the basis of its emphasis on lack of causation, it appears that its underlying





Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1967
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
Jones v. Waterman S.S. Co.22 was employed by the Gooden court
in support of its indemnity decision. While the court's treatment of this
case was not extensive, closer scrutiny indicates that Jones does not compel
the indemnification result reached. Jones dealt with an indemnity cross-
claim for maintenance and cure paid by the defendant shipowner to one
of its seaman who was injured through the negligent maintenance of a pier
owned and operated by the impleaded defendant. The Jones court, in re-
quiring the indemnification, stated, in dicta, that a shipowner has an in-
demnity cause of action against a negligent third party for maintenance
and cure paid to a seaman injured by the third party, and that this right
exists even in the absence of a contractual or legal duty owed to the ship-
owner by the tortfeasor. Jones becomes distinguishable, however, when it
is realized that the shipowner was granted indemnification based on the
violation of an implicit contractual duty owed to him by the indemnitor.2 8
In Gooden, Judge Seitz stated that a multiplicity of suits would not
result from the instant decision. Granting the propriety of this considera-
tion as a criterion for deciding the rights of the litigants before the court,
the conclusion reached would nevertheless seem to be open to question.
As a result of Gooden, a cause of action for contribution or indemnity has
been created which did not previously exist, and another possibility for
litigation has been introduced.
It may be contended that the holding in Gooden will subject ship-
owners in situations similar to Texaco to open-ended liability over to an
indefinite number of unknown shipowners. However, as the appellee
pointed out: "We fail to understand how the first shipowner's burden
becomes any greater solely because a subsequent shipowner, rather than
the seaman himself, is the moving party. '24 Effectively, then, the holding
will not increase a prior shipowner's liability for maintenance and cure.
Furthermore, the possibility of double liability on the part of a prior ship-
owner who must respond either for contribution or indemnity under
Gooden is negatived by the fact that a seaman cannot have a double recovery
on a single claim.
2 5
Although the Gooden court did not mention the significance of a
causal connection between the seaman's initial injury and his "heightening"
of that injury, it is logical to assume that if the causal connection does not
exist, equities would dictate a denial of either contribution or indemnity.
The court in the case at bar has endeavored to establish a right of
contribution or indemnity between shipowners so that the ultimate liability
22. 155 F.2d 992 (3d Cir. 1946).
23. Id. at 999-1,000. The duty was to maintain a pier fit for the use for which it
was intended. It arose impliedly as a result of a contractual relationship between the
shipowner and the pier owner.
24. Brief for Appellee at 16, Gooden v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 378 F.2d 576 (3d
Cir. 1967).
25. Vickers v. Tumey, 290 F.2d 426, 435 (5th Cir. 1961) ; McCarthy v. American
E. Corp., 175 F.2d 727, 729 (3d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 911 (1950).
[VOL. 13
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for the seaman's maintenance and cure will not be governed by the sea-
man's capriciousness in deciding against whom to proceed to satisfy his
claim for maintenance and cure. This end will be achieved, but only if the
seaman does not give the prior shipowner a release from the coextensive
claim.26 Consequently, to a degree, the seaman still controls the subsequent
shipowner's rights against the prior shipowner, for the subsequent ship-
owner has no cause of action for contribution or indemnity where the prior
shipowner has acquired a valid release from the seaman. The equitable
purpose of Gooden, then, conceivably could be frustrated by the conduct of
the seaman, the very person against whom the court has attempted to insu-
late shipowners by creating these new rights of contribution and indemnity.
An ancillary effect of the Gooden holding will be to encourage out-of-
court settlements by prior shipowners, thereby insuring prompt payment
to seamen. 27 Previously, the prior shipowner could not be sued for con-
tribution or indemnity by the subsequent shipowner when the subsequent
shipowner completely satisfied the coextensive maintenance and cure claim.
Therefore, the prior shipowner was less likely to settle out of court because,
by waiting, he could be released of all liability on a coextensive claim if
the subsequent shipowner satisfied the claim. Under Gooden, however, the
prior owner will not be released from liability for contribution or indemnity
unless he settles out of court and acquires a release from the seaman. Thus,
the incidence of immediate payments to seamen by prior shipowners will
necessarily increase.
Despite the lack of case precedent which directly supported its con-
clusion, the result reached by the court in Gooden is justifiable in light of
the underlying equities it sought to effectuate. With respect to practical
considerations, the effects of the holding will not prejudice the rights of
either shipowners or seamen. Shipowners are not subjected to any greater
liability, and seamen will still be able to get prompt payment for their
maintenance and cure claim. In fact, the number of instances in which they
will receive immediate payment will be increased.
Ralph J. Scola
26. The court expressly conditioned the right of contribution or indemnity between
shipowners on the absence of a release. 378 F.2d at 581. Thus when a shipowner settles
out of court with a seaman and procures a release, the shipowner becomes insulated
from another shipowner's action for either contribution or indemnity.
27. There is no doubt that prompt payment will result where the seaman seeks
satisfaction from the subsequent shipowner initially. If the subsequent shipowner does
not settle out of court, the procedure established by Gooden in the event of a suit will
insure immediate payment. The court required that immediate payment be made to
the seaman by the shipowner against whom the seaman proceeded regardless of the
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ANTITRUST - FRANCHISING - VERTICAL CUSTOMER AND TERRI-
TORIAL RESTRICTIONS ON GOODS Sold BY MANUFACTURER ARE
ILLEGAL PER SE.
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co. (U.S. 1967)
In 1951, in order to compete more effectively with mass merchandisers,
discounters, and importers, appellee, then the leading bicycle manufacturer
in the United States,' initiated a distribution system aimed at limiting
the number of its outlets to those which would actively promote and service
Schwinn products.2 Schwinn's principal methods of distribution under
this new scheme were (1) sales to distributors, primarily cycle distributors,
B. F. Goodrich, and hardware jobbers, (2) sales to retailers by means of
consignment or agency arrangements with distributors, and (3) sales to
retailers under the Schwinn Plan by which Schwinn shipped directly to
the retailers, invoiced the retailers, extended credit, and paid a commission
to the distributor taking the order. Schwinn's distributors were instructed
to sell only to franchised Schwinn retailers within specifically assigned
territories, and the franchised retailers were in turn requested to sell only
to consumers and not to unfranchised retailers or discount houses. Schwinn
threatened to refuse to deal with those distributors, and to cancel the
franchise of those retailers who failed to comply.3
The Justice Department brought a civil action against Schwinn,
Schwinn Cycle Distributors, and B. F. Goodrich, charging them with
price-fixing and with the imposition of territorial and customer restrictions
in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.4 The district court
rejected the charge of price-fixing, but found that the territorial restric-
tions, stemming from a conspiracy between the distributors and Schwinn,
were illegal per se as to Schwinn products sold outright. 5 The Justice
Department on appeal to the Supreme Court asked that the district court
decision be expanded to forbid territorial limitations in the agency, con-
signment, and Schwinn Plan transactions, and also that customer restric-
tion in such transactions, as well as in the sale for resale situation, be
forbidden. The Court, relying on the ancient doctrine against restraints
1. Schwinn's share of the market had fallen from 22.5% in 1951 to 12.8% in
1961, but its dollar and unit sales had risen substantially. United States v. Arnold,
Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 368 (1967).
2. Brief for Appellee at 23-33, United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388
U.S. 365 (1967).
3. As a result of the new distribution scheme the number of Schwinn sales per
dealer and the number of overall sales have increased sharply, while retail prices of
Schwinn bicycles have decreased. Id. at 40-42. The Court did not find that Schwinn
had actually cancelled the franchises of any non-conforming dealers.
4. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964) provides:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, is declared to be illegal. ...
5. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 237 F. Supp. 323 (N.D. Ill. 1965).
[VOL. 13
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on alienation, held that passage of title cuts off the seller's right to impose
any restrictions, territorial or customer, upon the buyer, and any attempts
to do so are illegal per se. Furthermore, vertical customer and territorial
restraints in non-sale situations are to continue to be tested by the "rule
of reason,"6 which, in this case, operates in favor of the appellee. United
States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
Trade between men has from early ages been subject to various
social restrictions. 7 Our present antitrust laws governing restraint of trade
date back to fifteenth century English cases which made it illegal for a
man to contract not to practice his trade.8 Later, however, such an agree-
ment became permissible when ancillary to the sale of a business, provided
it did not restrict the promissor-seller more than reasonably necessary to
protect the buyer's interest.9 The common law precept of free trade tem-
pered by those restrictions ancillary to doing business were assimilated,
along with the statutes of several states, into the Sherman Antitrust Act
of 1890. Section 1 of the Act10 does not literally embody a principle of.
reasonableness" and it was not until Standard Oil Co. v. United States'2
that the Supreme Court read a standard of reasonableness into the Sherman
Act. 1 3 The basic theory of the rule was subsequently explained in Board
of Trade v. United States:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as
merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition, or
whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To
determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts
peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition
before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint
and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the
evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy,
the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts.
14
With the number of antitrust cases rapidly multiplying,' 5 and each
defendant attempting to justify its activities as reasonable in the light of
its particular economic fact situation, the courts developed a doctrine of
6. Discussed p. 198 infra.
7. J. VAN CIS4, UNDERSTADING THE ANTITRUST LAWS 3-9 (1963).
8. Loevinger, The Rule of Reason in Antitrust Law, 19 ABA ANTITRUST SeC-
TION 245 (1961).
9. See cases collected in M. HANDLUR, CASES ON TRAD4 REGULATION 106-07
(3d ed. 1960).
10. See note 4 supra.
11. On its face, section 1 applies if there is a contract, combination, or conspiracy
and this contract, combination, or conspiracy is in restraint of interstate or for-
eign trade.
12. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
13. [11t was intended that the standard of reason which had been applied at the
common law . . . be the measure used for . . . determining whether, in a given
case, a particular act had or had not brought about the wrong against which the
statute provided.
Id. at 60.
14. 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
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per se Sherman Act violations, branding certain restrictions patently
illegal.1 6 As explained in Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States:
[T]here are certain agreements or practices which because of their
pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are
conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal with-
out elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the
business excuse for their use.
17
Though the FTC has rejected a per se approach to vertical' 8 customer
restrictions, 9 the Justice Department has continually pressed its argument
that both customer and territorial limitations, vertically imposed, should
be per se illegal.2 0 Justice Department policy statements and threats of
criminal prosecution 2 1 resulted in a series of unlitigated consent decrees,
22
but it was not until White Motor Co. v. United States23 that the issue
was brought before the Supreme Court. The Court there refused to find
vertical customer and territorial limitations to be illegal per se and re-
manded the case,2 4 claiming it knew too little of the impact of such restric-
tions to reach a conclusion solely on the basis of the documentary evidence
before it. Using the rule of reason approach, the cases following White
have continually permitted vertically imposed outlet limitations provided
16. For a comprehensive history of the per se rule see von Kalinowski, The Per
Se Doctrine - An Emerging Philosophy of Antitrust Law, 11 U.C.L.A.L. Rtv. 569
(1964).
17. 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
The per se rule has been applied in: United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil
Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (horizontal price-fixing); United States v. Parke-Davis &
Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220
U.S. 373 (1911) (vertical price-fixing) ; Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States,
341 U.S. 593 (1951); Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211
(1899) (division of markets) ; Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S.
207 (1959) ; Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941)
(group boycotts); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958) (tying
arrangements where a substantial portion of the market is foreclosed to competitors
of the tied product).
18. The term "vertical" refers to arrangements initiating with the manufacturer
and going down the distributive chain to distributors and/or retailers, while "hori-
zontal" indicates arrangements among parties at the same level of the distribution
ladder, e.g., agreements among retailers to divide territory.
19. Roux Distrib. Co., 55 F.T.C. 1386 (1959).
20. Jordan, Exclusive and Restricted Sales Areas Under the Antitrust Laws,
9 U.C.L.A.L. Rnv. 111, 149 (1962). Vertical restrictions (like Schwinn's) as to
where and to what customers a product may be sold, when not connected with price-
fixing, have generally met with widespread approval in the lower courts. See cases
collected in Handler, Recent Antitrust Developments, 112 U. PA. L. Rzv. 159n.32
(1963). For customer restriction only, see Pollock, Franchising Customer Restric-
tions and Building a Better Mousetrap, 10 ANTITRUST BULL. 381, 390-92 & n.28
1965). For territorial restriction only, see Robinson, Restraint on Trade and the
Orderly Marketing of Goods, 45 CORNtLL L.Q. 254, nn.32, 33 (1960).
21. See Hearings on the Automobile Marketing Legislation Before a Subcomm.
of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 89,
362 (1955) ; Comment, Restricted Channels of Distribution Under the Sherman Act,
75 HARv. L. Rev. 795, 796 (1962).
22. See cases collected in Robinson, supra note 20, at n.34.
23. 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
24. There was no further trial. White signed a consent decree ordering the
removal of territorial and customer restrictions from White franchise agreements.
United States v. White Motor Co., 1964 Trade Cas. 711,195 (N.D. Ohio 1964).
[VOL. 13
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they are justified by sound business reasons and do not unduly restrict
competition in the industry affected.
25
A brief look at the "economic and business stuff" 26 out of which
customer and territorial restraints arise is mandatory for an intelligible
analysis of the instant case. It is around "shopping goods,"27 such as
bicycles, cars, and appliances, which require a selective distribution
scheme, 28 that the American system of franchising arose.29  These goods
do not sell themselves; they require expert salesmen to point out the
product's hidden qualities and to help the customer choose the model best
suited to his particular needs.30 These goods may also need pre-condition-
ing or post-sale servicing, and the manufacturer, interested in preserving
customer good will, wants only reliable retailers selling and servicing
his products.A'
Because of the tremendous outlay necessary for successful distributing
and retailing, most manufacturers cannot afford to vertically integrate
and take over the distribution and retailing of their product.8 2 To compete
with the large corporate chains, a small manufacturer will, instead, grant
exclusive franchises to selected retailers, promising to supply his product
to no other retailer in each delineated area but the holder of the franchise
for that territory and reserving the right to terminate the franchises of
those who fail to pass muster. To keep his product out of unreliable hands,
he may, as Schwinn did, demand that his distributors sell only to franchised
retailers and that his retailers sell only to consumers.88  To protect the
25. See, e.g., Sandura Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1964) ; Snap-On Tools
Corp. v. FTC, 321 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1963) ; C.B.S. Business Equip. Co. v. Under-
wood Corp., 240 F. Supp. 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); United States v. Penn-Olin Chem.
Co., 217 F. Supp. 110 (D. Del. 1963), rev'd on other grounds, 378 U.S. 158 (1964)
Roux Distrib. Co., 55 F.T.C. 1386 (1959).
26. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963). For an ex-
tensive discussion of the economics of franchising and accompanying vertical restric-
tions see Comment, supra note 21; Jordan, supra note 20; Handler, supra note 20;
Statement by Milton Handler before the Small Business Administration, March 11,
1966, in 11 ANTITRUST BULL. 417 (1966).
27. "Shopping goods" are those more expensive, less frequently purchased items
for which a buyer will shop around and compare before buying. They are to be dis-
tinguished from "convenience goods," i.e., low-priced necessity-type items (toothpaste,
cereal, etc.) for which a buyer will readily accept substitute brands rather than go
out of his way. Convenience goods, therefore, require intensive distribution by getting
the product into as many outlets as possible.
28. Comment, supra note 21, at 795.
29. An SBA study found that four main factors gave rise to the great growth in
franchising: (1) Other distributive systems could not have been effected with the
same capital, the same trained personnel, and within the same period of time; (2)
"Voluntary" chains were established to compete with the corporate chains of the
twenties; (3) The franchise system lends itself to marketing those types of products
which will fare better when sold alone rather than in a variety store; and (4)
Franchising enables many men to satisfy their natural drive to own their own busi-
ness. Covey, Franchising and the Antitrust Laws: Panacea or Problem?, 42 NOTRIg
DAmg LAw. 605, 607 (1967).
30. Brief for Appellee at 21, United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S.
365 (1967) ; see Jordan, supra note 20, at 117.
31. Jordan, supra note 20, at 123.
32. Handler Statement, supra note 26, at 419; Jordan, supra note 20, at 111.
33. Schwinn's restriction of its distributors and retailers to certain classes of
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retailers from raids on their territories by other franchised retailers, he
may, by agreement or by threatening to refuse to deal with raiders,
4
restrict each retailer to his assigned territory.15
The Court in Schwinn found that only if a manufacturer has parted
with title are customer and territorial restraints imposed by him illegal
per se. It could have found such restraints illegal per se in both sale and
non-sale situations and justified such a holding if an intensive investigation
into the economics of the area, as suggested by White, had revealed that,
in the vast majority of instances, such restrictions have resulted in undue
restraint of competition. Per se rules, in the past, rationally evolved by
applying the rule of reason to the area in general rather than to a specific
fact situation."
[1In deciding whether to place a practice in the per se illegal class,
we ask whether actual experience over the years has demonstrated
that the practice is so harmful and so without redeeming virtue as to
warrant forbidding it across the board, without consideration of its
particular effects in every case. . . . [P] er se rules are not drawn out
of thin air; they are the product not of abstract theory but of practical
experience and market realities.
8 7
The Court in Schwinn, however, does not appear to have followed
this procedure in arriving at its decision to apply a per se ban on vertical
outlet restraints. It made no claim to have based its conclusion on an in-
vestigative finding that outlet limitations do, in fact, hamper inter-brand
competition. The Court could also have reasoned, along the lines of
Northern Pacific,38 that the multiplicity of suits and the cost of lengthy
investigation into an infinite variety of fact situations warranted a per se
approach which would, in addition, provide more certainty to the busi-
nessman honestly trying to conform to the Sherman Act.
8 9
34. In holding that a manufacturer's use of a mere threat of refusal to deal, aimed
at influencing distributors to whom he has sold his product, may constitute a per se
violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, the Schwinn decision has eliminated much
of the battling as to whether some kind of "agreement" falling within section 1 has
occurred. See discussion of United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919) in
1955 R4PORT OV Tit ATr'Y GEN'L's NAT'L COMM. TO STUDY THP ANTITRUST LAWS
15-16; United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 391 n.12 (1967) (dis-
sent) ; Halper, Individual Refusals to Deal: Customer Selection or Dealer Protec-
tion?, 22 ABA ANTITRUST SEcTIoN 49 (1963).
35. A number of business requirements may be served by vertical arrangements.
They may assure sources of supply or market outlets; enable the manufacturer
to obtain energetic distribution and insure that the distributor devote its time and
effort to developing sales in his territory; and extend limited protection to dis-
tributors against intra-brand competition, thereby stimulating inter-brand com-
petition. These arrangements enable manufacturers to reduce selling costs and
minimize credit risks. Furthermore, a manufacturer can derive prestige for his
product by dealing with only one dealer in a market, particularly where that
dealer has established goodwill in the area.
von Kalinowski, supra note 16, at 590.
36. Id., at n.5.
37. Elman, "Petrified Opinions" and Competitive Realities, 66 COLUM. L. REv.
625, 626-27 (1966).
38. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
39. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market
Division, 75 YALE L.J. 373, 387 (1966) ; Loevinger, supra note 8, at 250.
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Instead, the Court's decision to condemn as illegal per se only those
vertical customer and territorial restraints imposed on goods actually sold
by the manufacturer was based on the ancient prohibition against restraints
on alienation rather than on a finding of actual restraint of trade.40 While
the doctrine against restraints on alienation of property might have had
meaning in Lord Coke's day, it is doubtful whether the doctrine has rele-
vance in a twentieth century business setting.41 The Court decided that a
manufacturer has no right to control the marketing of his product once
he has sold it because technically, it is no longer his. But, as Professor
Chafee has noted:
[T]he strictly legal situation corresponds inadequately with the prac-
tical situation. Actually, the manufacturer by his advertising and other
commercial devices has brought the consumers into a direct relation
with himself. He is trying to make them buy his product, and they
think of themselves as buying his product.
4 2
Moreover, the manufacturer may be called upon to service the product,
repair or replace a defective model, or perhaps even pay for damages
caused by it. Therefore, even after a manufacturer has parted with his
goods, and parted with title to them, he nevertheless retains a very real
interest in what becomes of them.
48
In basing its decision on the pure form of an arrangement rather than
on substantive impact on competition, the Court has reversed its position
taken in Simpson v. Union Oil Co.44 There the respondents had refused
leases to "consignees" who had neglected to maintain suggested prices.
Said the Court then:
To allow Union Oil to achieve price fixing in this vast distribu-
tion system through this "consignment" device would be to make
legality for antitrust purposes turn on clever draftsmanship. We
refuse to let a matter so vital to a competitive system rest on such
easy manipulation. 4,
Unfortunately, the ruling in Schwinn will result in just such outward
form changes for those who can easily effect them.46 For those who cannot,
40. The Court also reasoned that it would be inconsistent to forbid territorial
limitations upon goods bought by distributors for resale (as the district court did),
and, at the same time, permit Schwinn to require they be resold only to franchised
retailers. But, as Mr. Justice Stewart noted, the territorial limitations were in-
validated by the district court as the products of a horizontal conspiracy among the
distributors, while the customer limitations were purely vertical in nature. 388 U.S.
at 390.
41. Elman, supra note 37, at 629.
42. Chafee, Equitable Servitude on Chattels, 41 HARV. L. Rtv. 945, 947 (1928).
43. Elman, supra note 37, at 630.
44. 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
45. Id. at 24.
46. BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. No. 315, B-4 (July 25, 1967). Schwinn
itself already conducts 75% of its business by the court-approved Schwinn Plan. 388
U.S. at 370 n.3. Many businesses, however, may not be able to change to bona fide
agency or consignment arrangements with ease. Having indicated that it regards
these as the unusual rather than the usual methods of marketing, the Court will
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vertical integration to the distributor level will at least allow a manu-
facturer to choose his own retailers. 47 But such vertical integration will
inescapably result in the elimination of the middlemen and the relegation
of small distributors and retailers to the status of agents or employees,
48
thereby subverting Congress' declared national policy of protecting small
business.
49
The Court, however, has left a tiny crack in its "wall" of per se pro-
hibition when early in the opinion it intimates that a vertical restraint
might be shielded by the rule of reason if the restraining manufacturer
is a failing company or a newcomer. A per se rule that is not applicable
in all circumstances seems not to be strictly per se in the dictionary50
sense, or as applied in price-fixing, boycott, and other typical per se cases.
Instead, it approaches the reasoning used in holding tying arrangements
per se violations only if a substantial portion of the market is foreclosed
to competitors of the tied product.51
An absolute per se rule should not be applied to vertically imposed
territorial and customer restrictions in sale for resale situations as they
have not been shown to unduly limit competition either generally or in
this particular case. 52 Indeed, the Court called the restraints on Schwinn
products reasonable and necessary for Schwinn's survival - if title to
the goods had not passed. It failed to explain why the limitations suddenly
become unreasonable if title has in fact passed. If a manufacturer can
control its outlets by vertical integration, it should also be able to do so
to be superficial, regardless of the actual economic impact of the restrictions them-
selves. See Address by Mary Gardner Jones to 1967 F.B.A. Convention as reported
in BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE Rec. REP. No. 316, A-i (Aug. 1, 1967).
47. According to the Schwinn decision, a manufacturer may still grant exclusive
franchises, though the franchisees will be unprotected from raiders, provided "nothing
more is involved than vertical 'confinement' of the manufacturer's own sales of the
merchandise to selected dealers, and if competitive products are readily available."
388 U.S. at 376. Accord, Cherokee Laboratories, Inc. v. Rotary Drilling Service, Inc.,
5 TRADE REG. REP. (1967 Trade Cas.) ir 72,167, at 84,191 (5th Cir. July 25, 1967).
The court there stated that if the jury found that the defendant manufacturer refused
to sell to the plaintiff marketer, although a substitute product was unavailable, but
sold exclusively to another marketer who priced plaintiff out of business, a per se
Sherman violation might be found.
48. Handler Statement, supra note 26, at 420.
49. Handler Statement, supra note 26, at 435; 13 C.F.R. § 101.1 (1963) (Small
Business Administration - Purpose, function, general organization).
50. Webster defines per se as "by or of itself, intrinsically." WEBSTER'S Nnw
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY O THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1826 (2d ed. 1959).
51. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
52. There is not one iota of evidence that Schwinn's franchise program has in-
jured any dealer or any distributor, or has restrained trade in Schwinn's bicycles,
or in any other bicycle, domestic or foreign . . . The evidence is abundantly
clear that Schwinn's practice of eliminating dead timber, useless and inactive or
relatively inactive accounts, and persons and firms unable or unwilling to provide
service and parts replacements, and adopting and adhering to a franchise program
instead of restraining trade in Schwinn bicycles, has greatly enhanced trade in
Schwinn bicycles and has in fact been the salvation of Schwinn, just as it has
been of other small businesses . . . and has actually made for genuine competition
in the bicycle manufacturing industry.
Brief for Appellee at 42, United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967)
(quoting page one of the trial court record).
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by exclusive franchising coupled with vertical outlet restrictions. The
franchisor and franchisee may be viewed as parts of a single business
organization whose activities should be tested by their effect on inter,
rather than intra, brand competition, as indicated by market share and
the availability of comparable products. It is hoped that the Court will
widen the "crack" in the wall of per se illegality to once more let in the
light of the rule of reason.
Fortunata Giudice
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - EQUAL PROTECTION - CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENT PROHIBITING STATE FAIR HOUSING LAWS IS STATE
ACTION DENYING EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS.
Reitman v. Mulkey (U.S. 1967)
The Mulkeys, a Negro couple, instituted an action for damages and
injunctive relief against the owner and manager of an apartment house
who had refused to rent an apartment to them because of their race.
The action was brought under sections 51 and 52 of the California Civil
Code." The trial court granted judgment on the pleadings in favor of the
defendants on the grounds that sections 51 and 52 had been repealed by
the adoption of Proposition Fourteen at the 1964 general election. Propo-
sition Fourteen, which presently appears as article 1 section 26 of the
California Constitution, provides in part:
Neither the State nor any subdivision or agency thereof shall deny,
limit or abridge, directly or indirectly, the right of any person, who
is willing or desires to sell, lease or rent any part or all of his real
property, to decline to sell, lease or rent said property to such person
or persons as he, in his absolute discretion, chooses.
The Prendergasts, an interracial couple, filed suit under the same
sections of the California Civil Code to enjoin eviction from their apart-
1. All persons within the jurisdiction of this State are free and equal, and
no matter what their race, color, religion, ancestry, or national origin are entitled
to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services
in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever.
Cal. Civ. Code § 51 (West Supp. 1966).
Whoever denies, or who aids, or incites such denial, or whoever makes any
discrimination, distinction or restriction on account of color, race, religion, an-
cestry, or national origin, contrary to the provisions of Section 51 of this code,
is liable for each and every such offense for the actual damages, and two hundred
fifty dollars ($250) in addition thereto, suffered by any person denied the rights
provided in Section 51 of this code.
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ment. The lessor cross-complained for a declaratory judgment entitling
him to terminate the tenancy even though his decision to evict was based
on race. The court denied defendant's motion for summary judgment
concluding that judicial enforcement of an eviction would violate the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.2
Both cases were appealed to the California Supreme Court where the
trial court was reversed in Mulkey v. Reitman3 and affirmed in Prender-
gast v. Snyder.4 Giving careful consideration to the views of the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court, the United States Supreme Court affirmed, holding
that article 1, section 26 of the California Constitution would involve
the state in private racial discrimination to such a degree that it would
be in violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
It is well-established that the restrictions of the fourteenth amend-
ment apply only to action by the state, and not to private discriminatory
activity.5 For this reason, the sine qua non of successful civil rights
cases based on the equal protection clause has been the existence of state
action.8 This concept, as it has been judicially defined, has been found in
two general areas. The first includes those cases where the state, through
its own exertion of power, directly contributes in some way to private dis-
criminatory activity. The cases in this area may be further subdivided
into two categories, the former involving the judiciary in state action,7
the latter involving legislative or executive action.8 The second general
area in which state action has been found is where the private dis-
criminator may be said to be acting as the state because of the private
individual's relationship to the state, or because of the function involved.9
2. "No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
3. 64 Cal. 2d 529, 413 P.2d 825, 50 Cal. Rptr. 881 (1966).
4. 64 Cal. 2d 877, 413 P.2d 847, 50 Cal. Rptr. 903 (1966).
5. United States v. Powell, 212 U.S. 564 (1909) ; Hodges v. United States, 203
U.S. 1 (1906); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) ; United States v. Harris, 106
U.S. 629 (1882) ; United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
6. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) ; Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3
(1883).
7. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953) (state court judicial decision allow-
ing damages for breach of racially discriminatory restrictive covenant) ; Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (state court decision enforcing racially discriminatory
restrictive covenant).
8. Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153 (1964) (state regulations placing extra
burdens on integrated restaurants) ; Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399 (1964) (statute
requiring race of candidates on ballot) ; Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963)
(city police chief's command not to protest segregation in restaurants); Peterson v.
City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963) (city ordinance proscribing racially desegre-
gated restaurant facilities); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715
(1961) (concurring opinion) (state statute authorizing restaurant to refuse service
to persons offensive to the major part of its customers).
9. Evans v. Newton, 383 U.S. 296 (1966) (exclusion of Negroes by private
trustees of park previously under municipal control) ; Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (refusal of service by the lessee of restaurant facilities
in a state-owned building) ; Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (exclusion of
Negroes from voting in the primaries of a local political organization) ; Simkins v.
Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964) (dis-
crimination by state-financed hospital).
[VOL. 13
14
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [1967], Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.l w.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss1/8
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
In such cases no affirmative exertion of state power directly contributing
to the private discrimination is required, but special circumstances relating
to the private discrimination may cause the state to be responsible there-
for, even though it is only indirectly involved in such action.
The concept of state action in general appears to be undergoing
judicial reevaluation. Language in the two concurring opinions, involving
six Justices, in the recent Supreme Court case of United States v. Guest' °
indicates an inclination to eliminate the requirements of state action al-
together." In the area of housing in particular, the Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit, in a case1 2 decided after Reitman, denied the existence
of a right to be free from private discrimination. However, the court
expressed its opinion that it would not be surprising if the Supreme Court
were to hold that the right to purchase property without discrimination
3
may be judicially enforced without consideration of the constricting state
action requirement of the fourteenth amendment. 1 4 In view of this judicial
uncertainty, and of the recent failure of Congress to pass open housing
legislation, it is extremely important to examine the implications of the
Reitman decision with a view toward future development in this area.
The majority opinion of the United States Supreme Court, written
by Mr. Justice White, limited itself almost exclusively to a consideration
of the direct relationship of the exertion of state power to private dis-
crimination. The Court concluded that the state had established a consti-
tutional right to discriminate, and had thereby encouraged and authorized
such private action. In coming to this conclusion, the Court relied heavily
on the California Court's findings concerning the impact, objectives, and
historical context of the adoption of Proposition Fourteen.'5
Mr. Justice Douglas, in a concurring opinion, emphasized the nature
of the private activity itself rather than the nature of Proposition Four-
teen. He concluded that because of the close connection between the
private marketing of housing and the zoning function, the large amount
of public finance involved, and the existence and amount of state regula-
tion and licensing in that area, urban housing is in the public domain,
10. 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
11. In that case, the six concurring Justices felt that section 5 of the fourteenth
amendment, which grants the power to Congress "to enforce, by appropriate legisla-
tion, the provisions" of the amendment, empower Congress to proscribe purely private
conduct. Id. at 761.
12. Jones v. Mayer, 36 U.S.L.W. 2007 (8th Cir., June 26, 1967).
13. The right to purchase property was set forth in the Civil Rights Act of 1866
which granted to all citizens of the United States the same right as is enjoyed by white
citizens to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.
Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
14. Although the statute had originally been passed pursuant to the thirteenth
amendment, the case of Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948), indicated that the 1870
reenactment of the statute imposed the fourteenth amendment restriction on the
right created.
15. In addition to the sections of the California Civil Code on which the plaintiffs
relied, California had enacted an impressive quantity of antidiscrimination legislation.
See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 374 (1967). The enactment of Proposition
Fourteen against this background was considered a critical factor by both the Cali-
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involves a public function, and therefore must meet fourteenth amendment
standards.
The dissent, written by Mr. Justice Harlan, criticizes the majority's
characterization of article 1, section 26 as affirmative state action which
encouraged and authorized the private discriminatory activity. The dis-
senting Justices view the provision as merely an expression of govern-
mental neutrality replacing a former policy of antidiscrimination.
In addition to its criticism of the result reached, the dissent also finds
fault with the anlaysis employed by the majority. Although the examina-
tion of state action in terms of its impact, objective, and historical context
is a permissible technique of ascertaining the discriminatory nature of such
action,' 6 Mr. Justice Harlan strongly objects to the reliance placed
on the California Supreme Court's findings in this respect. The dissent
seems to feel that by relying on the California Court the majority was,
in effect, placing the burden on the petitioners to show the constitutionality
of article 1, section 26 rather than requiring the original plaintiffs to
demonstrate its unconstitutionality. While it is not at all clear that the
majority is doing anything more than simply "giving careful consideration
to its [the California Court's] views,"'1 the criticism of the dissent may
prove to be a possible basis for distinguishing the Reitman case in the
future.
A serious practical problem created by the decision, and perhaps the
basis of the dissent's most justifiable criticism, concerns the inhibition of
legislative flexibility in the area of housing which might result from the
Reitman opinion. Mr. Justice Harlan points out' s that state legislatures
in the future will be reluctant to enact antidiscrimination legislation in the
fear that such legislation may be unrepealable as a result of this decision.
Further, the decision has the effect of shifting the emphasis in this area
to the judiciary from the legislative process which, because of its flexi-
bility and political responsiveness, is better equipped to deal with the
problem.
The majority might have reached the same result and avoided most
of the dissent's criticism by applying the public function approach sug-
gested by Mr. Justice Douglas in his concurring opinion.' 9
Although the California court did not base its decision on the public
function theory, its citation and discussion of cases in that area20 suggested
the possibility of such an approach had the Supreme Court been anxious
to take it, and thereby establish an affirmative duty to prevent discrimina-
tion in housing. However, by focusing on Proposition Fourteen as a posi-
16. McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 235 U.S. 151 (1914); Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
17. 387 U.S. at 374.
18. Id. at 395-96.
19. See p. 201 and note 15 supra. It is interesting to note the similar divergent
approaches of Justices Douglas and White in the majority and concurring opinions
in Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 302 (1966).
20. See Mulkey v. Reitman, 64 Cal. 2d 529, 538-39, 413 P.2d 825, 831-32, 50 Cal.
Rptr. 881, 887-88 (1966).
[VOL. 13
16
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [1967], Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol13/iss1/8
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
tive assertion of state power, the court chose not to adopt the broader
approach in the field of housing, but rather to limit the implications of its
decision by a very specific holding.
2'
Although one may only speculate on the reasons underlying the
majority's rejection of the public function approach, one possibility is that
the Court felt that by adhering to the more traditional "direct" state action
analysis it would avoid conflict with congressional attempts to deal with
the politically sensitive problem of open housing.2 2 By reaching the desired
result without finding affirmative governmental responsibility or the corre-
lative individual right to be free from private discrimination in the field
of housing, the Supreme Court may be, in effect, evidencing a reluctance
to usurp the congressional function in this area. Further, by rejecting
Mr. Justice Douglas' suggestion, the Court may be expressing its disap-
proval of the broad, nondiscriminatory approach to the area of housing
which that theory necessarily entails and its recognition of the legislature
as the appropriate place for establishing the demarcation of specific areas
in which open housing should apply. How the Court analyzes this prob-
lem in the future may very well depend upon the development of the
open housing question in the political arena.
Nevertheless, a close examination of the Reitman opinion reveals that
the majority may have left room for the employment of the theory of
governmental responsibility in the field of housing. In fact, it might
be argued from an analysis of the cases cited by the majority that the
requirement of state action is actually so dramatically relaxed by the
instant case as to be virtually meaningless in this field, and possibly in
other areas as well.
The Court begins its opinion with a discussion of the nature of Propo-
sition Fourteen as a positive assertion of state power.2 3 It then reviews
several cases which define the concept of "significant involvement" in
private discrimination, and this section of the opinion creates a great
deal of analytical difficulty.24 A state may become "significantly involved"
21. It should be noted that the Supreme Court also ignored the California Court's
interpretation of the rule of Shelley v. Kraemer. The California Court relied on the
case of Abstract Inv. Co. v. Hutchinson, 204 Cal. App. 2d 242, 22 Cal. Rptr. 309
(1962) where it held that evidence of the plaintiff landlord's racial motivation in an
eviction proceeding must be admitted because judicial enforcement of a discriminatory
eviction would violate the Shelley rule. The Shelley rule, however, covered only the
situation where both parties to the immediate transaction were willing to deal with
each other and a third party attempted to use the judicial process to compel discrimi-
nation through the enforcement of a restrictive covenant. The California Supreme
Court's interpretation of Shelley extends the rule to cover the situation where one
party to the transaction is unwilling to deal with the other and the court, by giving
effect to his desires, merely makes discrimination possible.
Although the Supreme Court might also have avoided the problems cited
by the dissent by adopting this approach, in view of the Court's reluctance in the past
to give breadth to its opinion in Shelley, the Court's attitude on this point is not
difficult to understand. See Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110
U. PA. L. REv. 473 (1962).
22. It is paradoxical that the Court may be causing exactly the opposite effect
on the state level as pointed out by Mr. Justice Harlan. See note 17 supra.
23. 387 U.S. at 373-77.
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in private discrimination either directly25 or indirectly, 26 and the Court,
by citing both types of cases in its discussion of "significant involvement,"
makes no distinction along these lines. On the one hand, the Court cites
cases like Robinson v. Florida,27 Lombard v. Louisiana,2s and Peterson v.
City of Greenville29 which involve direct affirmative state action and on
which it had relied in the first part of the opinion.80 However, it also cites
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority"' and Nixon v. Condon8 2 in
which no direct exertions of state power were present but which involved
discrimination in "public functions" for which the state could otherwise be
held responsible. 8
The use of the Burton and Nixon cases along with the Peterson, Rob-
inson and Lombard cases may be interpreted in either of two ways. The
first interpretation is that the Court may now be willing to find the requisite
direct assertion of state power through such passive activity as "reposing
authority," "surrendering its function," or "permitting." Since any state
posture with respect to private activities might be veiwed in terms of
affirmative characteristics, 4 such an interpretation would lead to the virtual
dilution of the state action requirement altogether.
The other possible implication of the Court's analysis is the effective
elimination of the state action requirement through the extension of the
"public function" theory. As illustrated by Nixon and Burton, the state
may be held responsible for private discrimination because of the public
nature of the private activity, even though no direct assertion of state
power is involved. However, in the Reitman case, no such public nature
is recognized by the majority. The resulting situation, in which the Su-
preme Court is apparently willing to find the requisite "significant involve-
ment," involves the combination of a lack of positive direct state action,
25. See notes 7 and 8 supra.
26. See note 9 supra.
27. 378 U.S. 153 (1964).
28. 373 U.S. 267 (1963).
29. 373 U.S. 244 (1963).
30. See p. 200 & note 8 supra.
31. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
In commenting upon the Burton case, which involved discrimination by the
lessee of a state-owned building, the Court stated:
Although the State neither commanded nor expressly authorized or encouraged
the discriminations, the State had "elected to place its power, property and pres-
tige behind the admitted discrimination" and by "its inaction . . . has . . . made
itself a party to the refusal of service . . ." which therefore could not be con-
sidered the purely private choice of the restaurant operator.
387 U.S. at 380.
32. 286 U.S. 73 (1932).
In considering the Nixon case, where the executive committee of a political
party was permitted by the state to prescribe the qualifications of its members for
voting, the Court declared: "Reposing this power in the executive committee was
said to insinuate the State into the self-regulatory, decision-making scheme of the
voluntary association . . ." 387 U.S. at 379.
33. See p. 202 supra.
34. See 387 U.S. at 394-95 (dissenting opinion).
For an interesting approach along these lines, see generally Horowitz, Four-
teenth Amendment Aspects of Racial Discrimination in Private Housing, 52 CALIF.
L. Rv. 1 (1964).
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and a lack of those special circumstances which have enabled the Court
to find state responsibility through application of the public function doc-
trine. Therefore, by applying the public function cases, which do not
require direct assertion of state power, in its discussion of "significant in-
volvement" in an essentially private area, the Court has left room for the
interpretation that it is in effect discarding the state action limitation of
the fourteenth amendment.8 ,
A review of the Supreme Court's opinion in Reitman v. Mulkey in
terms of guidelines for future development must take into account two sig-
nificant points. The first is that the Supreme Court is reluctant, at the
present time, to apply the public function theory to the field of urban
housing and thereby establish affirmative governmental responsibility in
that area. This is evidenced by its strained finding of state action in this
case through the characterization of Proposition Fourteen as a positive
assertion of state power directly contributing to the private discrimina-
tory activity. However, it should also be noted that in its desire to limit
the basis of its decision, the Supreme Court has left room for a much more
radical inference, that is, that the state action requirement has been ef-
fectively eliminated, not only in the area of housing, but in other fields as
well.
Michael F. Rosenblum
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - RENT ABATEMENT - SECTION 143-(b)
OF THE NEW YORK SOCIAL WELFARE LAW PERMITTING RENT
ABATEMENT AND BARRING EVICTION OF WELFARE TENANTS HELD
CONSTITUTIONAL.
Farrell v. Drew (N.Y. 1967)
In 1962 the New York Legislature enacted the Spiegel Law which
provides that the Department of Welfare may make direct payments of
rent to the landlords of welfare recipients; that such payments may be
withheld from the landlord when violations of law "dangerous, hazardous
or detrimental to life or health" exist on the premises; that proof of
35. For an illustration of the confusion of the two areas which has already
resulted, see Commonwealth v. Brown, 36 U.S.L.W. 2027 (E.D. Pa., July 5, 1967),
involving the controversial Girard College problem. The court found that because of
the combination of such factors as the prior trusteeship of the city, the present general
governmental supervision, the tax exemptions and other special concessions granted
to Girard College, and the general "public" nature of the institution, the state was
involved in the discriminatory conduct to an unconstitutional degree. To support a
finding of unconstitutional "state involvement" in this indirect state activity, the court
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existing dangerous violations shall be a valid defense to any action
by the landlord for nonpayment of rent; that the welfare department may
make provision for payment of rent which was withheld, upon proof
that the dangerous violation was corrected. As amended in 1965 the law
further provides that in such actions the landlord shall not be entitled
to possession of the premises, eviction of the tenant, or a money judg-
ment against the tenant for nonpayment of rent.' Pursuant to these pro-
visions, the Department of Welfare abated all rent payments to the peti-
tioner, the lessor of an apartment building in which three welfare recipients
were tenants. The basis of the abatement was the existence of a door
which led to the apartment of another tenant. The door was not completely
self-closing, as required by law, and it had been reported as a violation
of the building code by a New York building inspector. Petitioner brought
summary eviction proceedings against the three tenants for nonpayment
of rent, and the Department of Welfare appeared on behalf of the
tenants, interposing the Spiegel Law as a defense to petitioner's actions.
The trial court held that section 143-(b) was constitutional, and after
finding that a condition hazardous to life and health did in fact exist
in the building, dismissed the eviction proceedings. On direct appeal, the
New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that section 143-(b) of the
New York Social Welfare Law is not a denial of equal protection of the
laws, an unconstitutional impairment of the landlord's contractual rights,
nor a deprivation of property without due process of law. Farrell v. Drew,
19 N.Y.2d 486, 227 N.E.2d 824, 281 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1967).
The failure of the common law to provide adequate rules of law to
ameliorate the substandard condition of slum housing2 has required the
passage of detailed housing codes which set minimum standards of safety
and decency for urban tenements.8 Generally, the sanctions imposed by
these codes have been unsuccessful in compelling slum landlords to comply
with the standards. 4 In order to remedy this, state legislatures have felt
constrained to provide that rent payments to violating landlords shall be
abated, at least until the violation is remedied.5
There are several statutory provisions presently in force in New York
which provide for the withholding of rent. Notable among these are the
receivership law6 and the rent impairing violations statute.7 The former
provides for the appointment of a receiver to collect and apportion rents
1. N.Y. Soc. WELFARt LAW § 143-(b) (1), (2), (5), (6) (McKinney 1966).
2. See Simmons, Passion and Prudence: Rent Withholding Under New York's
Spiegel Law, 15 BUFFALO L. Rev. 572, 575-78 (1966).
3. Id. at 579-80. N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW (McKinney 1966) is an example of
a legislative attempt to cope with this problem.
4. Gribetz and Grad, Housing Code Enforcement: Sanctions and Remedies, 66
COLUM. L. REv. 1254 (1966).
5. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 413.106 (1962) ; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-24(a)
(1960). It is the practice of the Department of Welfare of Chicago to withhold rents
under circumstances similar to those provided for by the Spiegel Law, but apparently
without legislative mandate. See Simmons, supra note 2, at 573 n.8.
6. N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 309 (McKinney Supp. 1967).
7. N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 302-(a) (McKinney Supp. 1967).
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for the repair of buildings declared public nuisances," and the latter for
the abatement of rent if a rent impairing9 violation is not officially dis-
missed by the Department of Buildings within six months after it notifies
the landlord of the violation.' °
The New York courts, when faced with an attack on the constitution-
ality of such statutes, have generally taken a common approach, upholding
them as valid exercises of the police power of the state." These courts,
however, seem to deemphasize the constitutional issues raised by the
statutes and to emphasize the fact that rent laws foster the public interest
in the maintenance of safe and sanitary housing and that public policy
demands that the legislature provide adequate means to remedy the de-
plorable conditions of urban slums.
Not all rent withholding legislation, however, has been without consti-
tutional defect. In Central Say. Bank v. City of New York,'12 the court
held the receivership law of 1937'1 to be a deprivation of property without
8. The law further provides that the receiver shall have a lien for any expenses
incurred in the repair of a building and that this lien has priority over all other liens,
except taxes and assessments. N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 309(4) (a) (McKinney
Supp. 1967).
9. A rent impairing violation is one that constitutes, or will constitute if not
promptly corrected, a serious hazard to health and life. N.Y. MuL'r. DWELL. LAW
§ 302-(a)(2)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1967).
The procedure provided for determining what violations will be classified as
rent impairing is particularly noteworthy. Within six months after the enactment of
§ 302-(a), the Department of Buildings was to promulgate a list of violations which
it proposed to classify as rent impairing. Within thirty days thereafter, the Depart-
ment was to hold a public hearing at which time all interested parties were to be
heard as to the propriety of the classifications. A final list would then be promulgated
which could be amended only after notice and public hearing. N.Y. MULT. DWELL.
LAW § 302-(a)(2)(b)-(d) (McKinney Supp. 1967).
10. In addition to the receivership law and the rent impairing violations statute,
the following provide for rent withholding: N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 302(1) (a)-(b)
(McKinney 1966) provides for the abatement of rent when a multiple dwelling is
occupied without the issuance of a certificate of occupancy; N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTIONS
§ 755 (McKinney 1966) provides for a stay of eviction proceedings or action for
rent in New York City upon proof that a landlord has failed to make repairs ordered
by the Department of Buildings, if the conditions ordered to be remedied are such
as to constructively evict the tenant; N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTIONS §§ 769-82 (McKinney
Supp. 1967) provides that one-third or more of the tenants of a multiple dwelling
in New York City may petition for a special proceeding to have their rent payments
deposited into court to remedy conditions dangerous to life, health, or safety; NEW
YORK CITY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § Y51-5.0(h) (3) (1963) provides that the City Rent
and Rehabilitation Administration may reduce the maximum rents of a building certified
by, the proper agency to be a fire hazard or in a continually dangerous condition.
11. The receivership law was held constitutional by In re Department of Bldgs.,
14 N.Y.2d 291, 200 N.E.2d 432, 251 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1964); the rent impairing viola-
tions statute by Ten West 28th St. Realty Corp. v. Moerdler, 52 Misc. 2d 109,
275 N.Y.S.2d 144 (Sup. Ct. 1966) ; the tenants' petition statute by Himmel v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, 47 Misc. 2d 93, 262 N.Y.S.2d 515 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1965) ; the con-
structive eviction violations law by Emray Realty Corp. v. DeStefano, 5 Misc. 2d
352, 160 N.Y.S.2d 433 (Sup. Ct. 1957) ; the rent reducing ordinance by F & M Realty
Co. v. Gabel, 40 Misc. 2d 1098, 244 N.Y.S.2d 660, aff'd mem., 21 App. Div. 2d 853,
252 N.Y.S.2d 285, appeal denied, 14 N.Y.2d 490, 202 N.E.2d 159, 253 N.Y.S.2d 1028
(1964). The certificate of occupancy law has yet to be challenged on constitutional
grounds; however, a similar statute, IOWA CODE § 413.106 (1962), was upheld in
Burlington Apartments v. Manolato, 233 Iowa 15, 7 N.W.2d 26 (1942).
12. 279 N.Y. 266, 18 N.E.2d 151 (1938), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 661 (1939).
13. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1929 ch. 713, § 309, as amended, N.Y. Sess. Laws 1937
ch. 353, § 309(6). This law, similar to the present receivership law, provided that,
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due process of law insofar as it provided for a lien prior to a previously
recorded mortgage. The court reasoned that since the mortgagee was not
afforded an opportunity to be heard in regard to the actions of the Depart-
ment of Buildings, he was compelled to "sit idly by" while the value of
his lien was diminished.
14
The instant case presents several constitutional questions which will
be raised with greater frequency in the future, as additional states attempt
to legislate slum conditions out of existence. 15 Most significant of these
is whether the Spiegel Law deprives the landlord of his property without
due process of law. This issue has two aspects: first, whether the character
of notice and hearing provided for is violative of procedural due process,
and second, whether rent curtailment legislation is a valid exercise of
the police power of the state.
Since the Spiegel Law provides that it is a defense to the actions
of a landlord, it is incumbent upon him, not the Department of Welfare,
to initiate the suit in which the question of whether the rent should be
paid will be adjudicated. If he fails to bring eviction proceedings, he will
never have an opportunity to refute the withholding of his rents. Thus,
while the landlord is not compelled to "sit idly by," as was the mortgagee
under the receivership law of 1937,16 the Department of Welfare is not
required to initiate proceedings in which it will be compelled to substantiate
its finding. Such hearing is only afforded after rent has been withheld, and
after the landlord has taken action to collect it. In addition, the Spiegel
Law fails to provide for notice to the landlord of the existence of danger-
ous conditions on his premises prior to the withholding of his rents.
The New York Court of Appeals held that procedural due process
was satisfied even though the statute lacks explicit provision for notice
of violations, and hearing initiated by tenants or an appropriate agency.
The court reasoned that since the landlord can bring eviction proceedings
after his rents are abated, he is given ample opportunity for a hearing,
and, since the Spiegel Law is a defense to these proceedings, to be pleaded
as such, he is given sufficient notice of the existence of dangerous viola-
of Buildings, that Department may make the repairs. The expenses incurred were
to be assessed against the building, and the lien of the assessment was to have priority
over all other liens, except taxes and assessments. See pp. 206-07 & notes 6 and 8 supra.
14. 279 N.Y. at 275, 18 N.E.2d at 154.
The present receivership law obviates the deficiencies of the receivership law
of 1937 by providing for detailed notice and hearing procedures before rents are
withheld. In re Department of Bldgs., 14 N.Y.2d 291, 200 N.E.2d 432, 251 N.Y.S.2d
441 (1964).
15. Three lower courts have considered the constitutionality of the Spiegel Law.
In Milchman v. Rivera, 39 Misc. 2d 347, 240 N.Y.S.2d 859 (Bronx Civ. Ct. 1963),
appeal dismissed, 13 N.Y.2d 1123, 196 N.E.2d 55, 247 N.Y.S.2d 122 (1964), and in
Schaeffer v. Montes, 37 Misc. 2d 722, 233 N.Y.S.2d 444 (Bronx Civ. Ct. 1962), the
Spiegel Law was upheld as a valid exercise of the police power of the state to
promote safe and sanitary housing conditions. In Trozze v. Drooney, 35 Misc. 2d
1060, 232 N.Y.S.2d 139 (Binghampton City Ct. 1962), it was held unconstitutional,
apparently on the grounds that "[the Social Welfare Law is not the proper vehicle
to require compliance with minimum housing standards." Id. at 1064, 232 N.Y.S.2d
at 143.
16. See p. 207 & notes 12-14 supra.
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tions on his premises when he files suit.1 7 Although this procedure places
the burden of litigation on the landlord, there is ample authority to support
the court's conclusion that the character of the notice and hearing pro-
vided for is without constitutional defect. In Ewing v. Mytinger & Cassel-
berry, Inc.,18 the United States Supreme Court stated that, "It is suf-
ficient, where only property rights are concerned, that there is at some
stage an opportunity for a hearing and a judicial determination."' 9 Due
process, it would seem, does not require notice and hearing prior to the
abatement of rent, as long as the landlord is at some time given notice and
an opportunity to be heard. In no instance does it appear that due process
demands that a property owner be heard before he is deprived of his
property or that the hearing be initiated by the party seeking to affect his
property rights.
Though not violative of procedural due process, it is significant to
note that the notice and hearing procedures of the Spiegel Law are sub-
stantially different from those of other New York rent abatement statutes.
Some give the landlord a hearing before he is deprived of his rents,
20
and in others he must be given notice of the existence of violations on
his premises.
21
Objection to the Spiegel Law, based on the contention that it is an
abuse of the police power of the state, was dismissed by the court by the
citation of a number of cases which have held that the elimination of
dangerous housing conditions is a valid exercise of that power. 22 In
Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel23 and in Nordred Realties, Inc. v. Langley,
24
two statutes analogous to the Spiegel Law were upheld. In the Levy case,
the United States Supreme Court declared that a statute25 which provided
that the existence of an unreasonable and oppressive lease agreement
for the payment of rent shall be a defense to any action for rent, was a
valid exercise of the police power in promoting the public welfare. Simi-
larly, in Nordred, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the finding of
a lower court that a statute20 6 which provided for partial rent abatement
when a landlord fails to comply with certain provisions of the Multiple
17. Farrell v. Drew, 19 N.Y.2d 486, 492-93, 227 N.E.2d 824, 827, 281 N.Y.S.2d 1, 6.
18. 339 U.S. 594 (1950).
19. Id. at 599; accord, Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 442-43 (1944);
Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 520 (1944); Phillips v. Commissioner, 283
U.S. 589, 596-97 (1931).
20. Both the present receivership law and the tenants' petition statute provide
for a hearing before abatement of rent. The former places the burden of initiating
appropriate proceedings on the Department of Buildings, the latter on one-third of
the tenants of a multiple dwelling. See pp. 206-07 & notes 6, 8 and 10 supra.
21. The present receivership law, the tenants' petition statute, the rent impairing
violations statute, and the constructive eviction violations law all provide for notice
to the landlord of the existence of conditions that will cause his rents to be abated.
See pp. 206-07 & notes 6, 8 and 10 supra.
22. 19 N.Y.2d at 492, 227 N.E.2d at 827, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 5-6.
23. 258 U.S. 242 (1922).
24. 169 Misc. 659, 7 N.Y.S.2d 903 (Manhattan Mun. Ct.), aff'd mein., 279 N.Y.
636, 18 N.E.2d 38 (1938), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 655 (1939).
25. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1920 ch. 944 (expired 1922).
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Dwelling Law, "is one for the general health, safety, and welfare of the
public, and as such is valid .... 27
The only fairly recent authority that can be found to support the
position that rent laws are an abuse of the legislative power is Willson v.
McDonnell.2 This case held that a joint resolution of Congress known as
the Saulsbury resolution, 29 which prohibited eviction proceedings and,
with certain exceptions, perpetuated all existing leases in the District of
Columbia until a treaty was concluded with Germany after World War I,
was beyond the police power and as such an unconstitutional deprivation
of property. The precedential value of this decision is questionable, how-
ever, in light of the Levy decision two years later and the difference be-
tween the operative provisions of Saulsbury and Spiegel.
It has been contended that the Spiegel Law is unconstitutionally vague
because it fails to establish clear standards by which to determine those
violations that will be classified "dangerous, hazardous or detrimental
to life or health. °30 While the court dismissed this contention by appar-
ently grouping it with those arguments of the appellant that challenged
the statute's wisdom, as opposed to its constitutionality,8 1 there is suf-
ficient authority to support the dismissal. Courts generally scrutinize stat-
utes imposing civil sanctions less severely than those imposing criminal
sanctions, and, with but one exception,32 vagueness attacks on non-
criminal statutes have not succeeded in the Supreme Court.3 3 Further-
more, the holding of the Supreme Court in Levy, that the phrase "payment
of rent under an unreasonable agreement" was a sufficiently definite
standard, 34 would lend strong support to the argument that the phrase
"dangerous, hazardous or detrimental to life or health" does not render
the Spiegel Law void-for-vagueness.
27. 169 Misc. at 661, 7 N.Y.S.2d at 905.
Although it can be argued that the Levy and Nordred cases can be distin-
guished from the instant case because they upheld temporary emergency laws, it seems
more likely that a court faced with a law similar to the Spiegel Law would accept
these decisions as significant precedent in light of the many cases upholding non-
emergency rent legislation which have relied on them and other similar decisions.
Other cases upholding emergency rent laws are: Marcus Brown Holding Co. v.
Feldman, 256 U.S. 170 (1921); Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921) ; People ex rel.
Durham Realty Corp. v. La Fetra, 230 N.Y. 429, 130 N.E. 601 (1921). See cases
cited in note 11 supra for examples of cases which uphold nonemergency rent legislation
by relying on cases sustaining emergency rent legislation.
28. 265 F. 432 (D.C. Cir. 1919). The Willson case was followed in Groot v.
Reilly, 266 F. 1008 (D.C. Cir. 1919), and Heitmuller v. Stokes, 266 F. 1011 (D.C.
Cir. 1920). Palairet's Appeal, 67 Pa. 479, 5 Am. R. 450 (1871), also, held a rent
law to be an abuse of the police power.
29. Act of May 31, 1918, ch. 90, 40 Stat. 593.
30. Brief for Appellant at 17-19, Farrell v. Drew, 19 N.Y.2d 486, 227 N.E.2d
824, 281 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1967); Comment, Rent Withholding and the Improvement of
Substandard Housing, 53 CALM. L. Rnv. 304, 330 (1965) ; Recent Legislation, Abate-
ment of Rent in New York, 17 SYRACUsg L. Riv. 490, 502-03 (1966).
31. 19 N.Y.2d at 494, 227 N.E.2d at 828, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 7.
32. A. B. Small Co. v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 267 U.S. 233 (1925).
33. Note, The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA.
L. Rev. 67, 69-70 & n.16 (1960).
34. 258 U.S. at 249-50.
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Again, it is significant to compare this enactment with other New
York rent abatement statutes. Specifically, it can be seen that although the
rent impairing violations statute contains an equally vague general state-
ment concerning violations that are hazardous to health, it also establishes
an appropriate procedure for determining which violations will be deemed
rent impairing.
35
In addition to the propositions that the Spiegel Law is unconstitu-
tionally vague and a deprivation of property without due process of law,
it has been argued that it authorizes state action which denies equal protec-
tion of the laws. This argument may take either of two routes. First,
it is advanced that the statute creates a special category of tenants, welfare
recipients, who have been given special rights not granted to other tenants
in similar circumstances, thus denying equal protection to nonwelfare
tenants.36 This approach was dismissed by the court in the instant case
because the landlord lacked standing to raise the objection that the enact-
ment denies equal protection to someone else. 3 7 However, he may raise the
argument that the Spiegel Law discriminates against landlords of welfare
recipients in that it classifies them differently from all other landlords.
The court rejected this contention, reasoning that a reasonable basis exists
for distinguishing between landlords of welfare recipients and landlords
of nonwelfare recipients because the former are notorious for failing to
remedy the despicable condition of their premises.38 The court's conclusion
is again strongly supported by authority. As the United States Supreme
Court stated in Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co.:
The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does
not take from the State the power to classify in the adoption of
police laws, but admits of the exercise of a wide scope of discretion
in that regard, and avoids what is done only when it is without any
reasonable basis and therefore is purely arbitrary.3 9
35. See p. 207 & note 9 supra.
36. Farrell v. Drew, 19 N.Y.2d 486, 494, 227 N.E.2d 824, 828, 281 N.Y.S.2d 1, 7
(1967) (dissenting opinion) ; Brief for Appellant at 10-12, Farrell v. Drew, supra.
Contra, Schaeffer v. Montes, 37 Misc. 2d 722, 728, 233 N.Y.S.2d 444, 450-51 (Bronx
Civ. Ct. 1962).
37. 19 N.Y.2d at 491, 227 N.E.2d at 826, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 4; see, e.g., United
States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960) ; Guardian Life Ins. Co. v. Chapman, 302 N.Y.
226, 97 N.E.2d 877 (1951).
Since only a non-welfare tenant - a party disinterested in the landlord,
Department of Welfare, welfare tenant triangle - has standing to sue, it is unlikely
that this objection will ever be considered by an appellate court.
38. 19 N.Y.2d at 491-92, 227 N.E.2d at 826-27, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 5.
39. 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911). Accord, Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 732
(1963) ; Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Mrkt., 366 U.S. 617, 624 (1961) ; Allied Stores
v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 528 (1959) ; Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483,
489 (1955); People ex rel. Durham Realty Corp. v. La Fetra, 230 N.Y. 429, 447,
130 N.E. 601, 607 (1921).
Only the holding of the court in Willson, that the Saulsbury resolution dis-
criminated against owners of property already under lease, would support the proposi-
tion that laws similar to Spiegel deny landlords equal protection of the laws.
The court's decision to reject the landlord's final argument that the Spiegel
Law is an unconstitutional impairment of the obligations of his contract is also well-
supported by authority. See, e.g., East New York Sav. Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230
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Although the conclusion of the court cannot be questioned from the
point of view of the application of constitutional precedent, examination
of the provisions of similar New York enactments raises the question
of whether the legislature has proceeded in the wisest manner in its effort
to eliminate slum conditions. The legislature could have required the
Department of Welfare to specify those violations it deemed hazardous
to life and health, to notify the landlord of the existence of dangerous
violations on his premises, and to hold an administrative hearing to
determine whether rent should be abated. It is suggested, however, that
the implementation of these alternatives would severely impede the realiza-
tion of the basic objective of the enactment, that is, to eliminate slum
conditions in the quickest, most efficient manner.
40
Joseph Torregrossa.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COM-
MERCE - OUT-OF-STATE MAIL ORDER HOUSE NOT REQUIRED TO
COLLECT ANOTHER STATE'S USE TAX WITHOUT HAVING LOCAL
NEXUS IN TAXING STATE.
National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue (U.S. 1967)
Appellant, a Missouri mail order house, solicited sales from, and
shipped goods to, consumers in Illinois. Appellant had neither retail outlets
nor sales representatives in Illinois. All solicitations were conducted
through the mail and all shipments were delivered by mail or common
carrier. The Illinois Department of Revenue, pursuant to the Illinois Use
Tax Act,' assessed use tax collection liability against appellant for all sales
to Illinois purchasers from July 17, 1961 to October 30, 1962. In an action
to determine the propriety of this assessment, the Illinois trial court ruled
for the appellee. This decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court of
Illinois.2 The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
commerce clause and the fourteenth amendment prevent a state from requir-
ing an out-of-state mail order house to collect a local use tax on goods
mailed or shipped by common carrier into the taxing state where the out-of-
state seller has no agents or business property in the taxing state and does
Durham Realty Corp. v. La Fetra, 230 N.Y. 429, 130 N.E. 601 (1921). Contra,
Palairet's Appeal, 67 Pa. 479, 5 Am. R. 450 (1871).
40. See Simmons, supra note 2, for an excellent discussion of the Spiegel Law
and its numerous problems of statutory interpretation.
1. ILL. ANN. STrATr. ch. 120, § 439.1-439.120 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1966).
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no advertising in the taxing state other than by mailed catalogs and
"flyers." National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S.
753 (1967).
The tax which Illinois had imposed was a general use tax, that is, a
tax levied on the privilege of using, storing, or consuming personal property
within the boundaries of the taxing state.3 It was complementary to the
sales tax, and its purpose was to discourage residents of the taxing state
from purchasing goods in a neighboring state where the sales tax was
lower or non-existent. The constitutionality of a general use tax was first
upheld in Henneford v. Silas Mason Co.,4 where the Court said that a
use tax imposed "when the chattel used or stored has ceased to be in transit
is now an impost so common that its validity has been withdrawn from
the arena of debate." 5 At present, there is no federal statutory law on
the question of interstate use tax collection.6 For such federal limitations
as there may be, the businessman must look to the Constitution and the
applicable cases interpreting it.
In both Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher,7 and General Trading
Co. v. Tax Commission,8 the state power to impose use tax collection on
out-of-state vendors was upheld because the sales were arranged by local
agents of the vendor in the taxing state. The same result was reached
where the mail order seller maintained local retail stores in the taxing
state." In these cases, the out-of-state vendor was plainly accorded the
protections and services of the taxing state. The case which represents the
furthest constitutional reach of a state's power to deputize an out-of-state
seller as its use tax collector is Scripto, Inc. v. Carson.10 There, the Court
held that Florida could impose upon a Georgia seller the duty of collecting
the Florida use tax, for the seller had ten independent contractors con-
ducting continuous solicitation in Florida and forwarding the resulting
orders to the Georgia seller for shipment of the ordered goods." In Miller
Bros. v. Maryland,'2 however, the Court denied the taxing state the power
to deputize an out-of-state vendor as its use tax collector. There, a Dela-
ware seller sold its merchandise at its Delaware store to residents of
3. See generally P. HARTMAN, STAT TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCS
131-46, 161-80 (1953).
4. 300 U.S. 577 (1937).
5. Id. at 583.
6. There is, however, a bill presently before the House, H.R. 2158, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1967), which deals with the problem of interstate use tax collection.
This bill was reported out favorably by the House Committee on the Judiciary on
March 7, 1967. See Dane, A Solution to the Problem of State Taxation of Interstate
Commerce, 12 VILL. L. Rnv. 507 (1967).
7. 306 U.S. 62 (1939).
8. 322 U.S. 335 (1944).
9. Nelson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 312 U.S. 373 (1941) ; Nelson v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359 (1941). In fact, National Bellas Hess acknowledged
its obligation to collect a use tax in Alabama, Kansas, and Mississippi, since it had
retail stores in those states.
10. 362 U.S. 207 (1960). National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue,
386 U.S. 753, 757 (1967).
11. 362 U.S. 207 (1960).
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Maryland, the state imposing the use tax. There was no solicitation of
Maryland residents by the seller other than the incidental effects of general
advertising. Clearly, there was no invasion or exploitation of the out-of-
state consumer market.'
1
An analysis of the present decision must necessarily consider the
commerce clause impediments to Illinois' right to impose the burden of
use tax collection upon National Bellas Hess. Mr. Justice Stewart, speak-
ing for the Court, noted that the very purpose of the commerce clause was
to insure a national economy free from unjustifiable local entanglements
and concluded that the imposition of use tax collection would result in
impediments upon the free conduct of National Bellas Hess' interstate
business.1 4 In so doing, the Court reasoned that state taxation falling on
interstate commerce can only be justified when designed to make such
commerce bear a fair share of the costs of the state whose protection it
enjoys.'5 This statement compels the conclusion that many cases which
are ostensibly decided on the basis of the commerce clause contain language
with strong due process overtones, which in turn suggests that the two
concepts, at times, are inextricably entwined. Apparently, the Court
becomes confused as to whether a denial of due process or an undue burden
upon interstate commerce is in issue.'( It is clear, however, that some
of the burdens on interstate commerce which Mr. Justice Stewart con-
sidered onerous were the duty of recordkeeping and other administrative
tasks which must be performed incidental to compliance with the collection
of a use tax.
17
In support of its holding, the Court relied heavily on the findings of
the Subcommittee of the House of Representatives in their special study
dealing with state taxation of interstate commerce.' 8 The study repeatedly
refers to the onus on the small mail order house that would result if they
were required to collect use taxes.19 However, it is extremely doubtful
13. The Court held that the State of Maryland had no jurisdiction to make
Miller Bros. a use tax collector and stated that, "due process requires some definite
link, some minimum connection, between a state and the person, property or transac-
tion it seeks to tax." 347 U.S. at 344-45. The Scripto Court, in distinguishing Miller
Bros., stated that in Miller Bros., "there was no 'exploitation of the consumer market';
no regular, systematic displaying of its products by catalogs, samples or the like."
362 U.S. at 212. In the instant case, the dissent relies on this language in Scripto
to support its economic exploitation standard. 386 U.S. at 762.
14. 386 U.S. at 759-60.
15. Id. at 756. See Northwestern States Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450,
462 (1959); Central Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653, 663 (1948);
Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 253 (1946).
16. In General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436 (1964), the Court
answered a commerce clause challenge to a gross receipts tax with due process
precedent, as was aptly pointed out in Justice Brennan's dissent. Id. at 449, 450.
17. 386 U.S. at 755, 759-60.
18. See H.R. R4P. No. 565, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 631-35 (1965). See generally
Dane, supra note 6.
19. Small mail order houses do not keep records of sales by states, and to require
them to do so would in itself impose a hardship on them. These small mail order
businesses realize a considerable saving by not keeping detailed records of invoices.
The added expense of recordkeeping which would be necessary to comply with
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whether National Bellas Hess can be said to fit into this small mail order
house category.20 In addition, the same House Report which seems to
have influenced the majority, and which was cited by appellant's counsel
in his brief,21 states that the use tax collection problem, and thus the
burden on interstate commerce, is considerably mitigated where goods are
offered in a catalog operation.22 Of course, it is conceded that against the
state's legitimate taxing rights must be weighed the burden placed on in-
terstate commerce by compelling the seller (1) to allocate his sales by
states; (2) to inform himself with respect to the use tax laws of the states
in which he sells; (3) to determine in some cases whether the article is
a taxable or non-taxable item; and (4) to prepare and file use tax returns.
In this respect, both Miller Bros. and Scripto indicate that one decisive
question is whether, in a particular case, the seller knows, or reasonably
should know, the destination of the goods which he sells. The fact that
the seller did not, in most instances, know that the goods sold over the
counter were going to incur a use tax liability was of considerable import
in Miller Bros.23 Similarly, the Scripto Court was influenced by the fact
that all of the goods upon which a use tax was assessed were delivered
by shipment from the seller's warehouse to the out-of-state buyers. It
was, therefore, a slight burden on interstate commerce to require the seller
to ascertain the orders upon which the use tax was due.24 Giving weight
to the knowledge of destination factor is actually to employ a test of prac-
tical fairness, since it would be unfair to make the seller liable for collecting
taxes that it did not know were due. Employing this factor in the instant
case, it would appear that there was no burden on interstate commerce
since National Bellas Hess necessarily knew the states in which its goods
would be used.
The Court, in dealing with the due process question, considered two
issues: (1) whether the taxing state can impose a burden of use tax col-
lection on an out-of-state vendor; and (2) whether the vendor has sub-
mitted himself to the state's jurisdiction. The first issue seemingly has
never caused serious difficulty, for the Court has usually dismissed it
with the statement that to make the vendor a tax collector is a "familiar
and sanctioned device."' 2  This casual handling of the problem prompted
one commentator to assert that the "propriety of the arrangement whereby
the out-of-state seller is required to act as collector of the use tax on goods
use tax collection would be prohibitive. Hearings before the Special Subcomm. on
State Taxation of Interstate Commerce of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. 224 (1966).
20. In 1961, appellant's net sales were in the neighborhood of $60,000,000. This
substantial volume is obtained by twice-a-year catalog mailings, supplemented by
intermediate smaller sales books or flyers as the court below categorized them. The
company's mailing list includes over 5,000,000 names. National Bellas Hess, Inc. v.
Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 760-61 (1967) (dissenting opinion).
21. Brief for Appellant at 55, National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of
Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
22. H.R. Rlp. supra note 18, at 771.
23. 347 U.S. at 344. Id. at 357-58 (dissenting opinion).
24. 362 U.S. at 212-13.
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sold in interstate commerce and shipped into the taxing state [is a matter]
that must be taken on faith."'26 The second issue has proved to be more
vexing to the Court. It has been stated that a state may properly make the
out-of-state seller a use tax collector if he comes into the state and does
business, for he thereby submits himself to its power. 27 The Court in
Scripto rejected Scripto's contention that because their solicitors were in-
dependent contractors, not employees, they did not subject themselves to
the taxing power of the state. The Court observed: "To permit such
formal 'contractual shifts' to make a constitutional difference would open
the gates to a stampede of tax avoidance. '28  In the instant case, Justice
Stewart simply noted the absence of any physical bodies or physical plants,
and ignored the sweeping dictum in Scripto which supports the view that
a regular and systematic economic exploitation of the market in the taxing
state should be a sufficient "nexus."2 9 In short, the issue resolves itself
into whether the Court should have employed an economic exploitation
standard or the traditional one of some kind of physical presence.
In line with the economic exploitation standard, Justice Fortas in dis-
sent asserted that:
There should be no doubt that this large-scale, systematic, con-
tinuous solicitation and exploitation of the Illinois consumer market
is a sufficient "nexus" to require Bellas Hess to collect from Illinois
customers and to remit the use tax, especially when coupled with the
use of the credit resources of residents of Illinois, dependent as that
mechanism is upon the State's banking and credit institutions.
30
He then contended that National Bellas Hess enjoyed the benefits and
profited from the facilities nurtured by the State of Illlinois as fully as if it
had a retail store or maintained salesmen therein.81 In the due process
26. Howard, Constitutional Cases in the United States Supreme Court: 1941-46,
11 Mo. L. Rpv. 197, 253 (1946).
27. General Trading Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 322 U.S. 335, 337-39 (1944).
28. 362 U.S. at 211. Additionally, the Court stated, "The formal shift in the
contractual tagging of the salesmen as 'independent' neither results in changing his
local function of solicitation nor bears upon its [Scripto's] effectiveness in securing
a substantial flow of goods into Florida." Id. (emphasis added). This explicit refer-
ence in the Scripto case to the "effectiveness" of the economic exploitation of the
consumer market reinforces the economic exploitation standard proffered by the
dissent in National Bellas Hess.
29. See note 13 supra.
30. National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 761-62
(1967).
31. Id. This reasoning was also employed by the Illinois Supreme Court which
contended that regular, continuous, persistent solicitation has the same economic, and
should, therefore, have the same legal, consequences as does maintaining an office
for soliciting and contracting business. Department of Revenue v. National Bellas
Hess, Inc., 34 Ill.2d 164, 172, 214 N.E.2d 755, 759 (1966). Contra, State v. Lane
Bryant, Inc., 277 Ala. 385, 171 So.2d 91 (1965). In reply to the argument that the
state does not really confer any benefits upon a foreign vendor, the Court has recog-
nized that the foreign vendor benefits indirectly from the services the state provides
for its own citizens. These benefits include the stability of laws governing the market
place, transportation systems, and police protection. H. HINN, HANDBOOK OV TH4
LAW OP CORPORATIONS § 91, at 105-14 (1961). In this respect, Justice Frankfurter
said in Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co.:
A state is free to pursue its own fiscal policies, unembarrassed by the Constitu-
tution, if by the practical operation of a tax the state has exerted its power in
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sense, Justice Fortas felt that the present case was not at all controlled by
Miller Bros. because in that case there was no regular, systematic dis-
playing of products by catalogs, samples, or the like, to out-of-state con-
sumers, whereas in the instant case, appellant regularly exploited the
Illinois market by periodically mailing catalogs to regular customers and
bulk flyers to "occupant.
' ' 32
The economic exploitation standard for sufficient "nexus" is supported
by analogous cases in the area of in personam jurisdiction.33 In determining
the amenability of non-domiciliary corporations to the in personam jurisdic-
tion of state courts, the Supreme Court has based its opinions upon what
it has considered to be "traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice."'34 Since McGee v. International Life Ins. Co.,35 the test for in
personam jurisdiction can apparently be satisfied by the minimal contact
of a single solicitation without actual physical presence in the state. In
McGee, a single life insurance contract issued by the defendant to a
resident of the forum state and payment of premiums from the forum state
was sufficient contact to justify the exercise of in personam jurisdiction
over the insurance company. Since jurisdiction over nonresidents for
taxing purposes and jurisdiction for the purpose of exercising judicial
power over them have been intimated to be coextensive, 36 it would have
been a logical extension for the Court in the instant case to equate the
two tests. Indeed, a test for taxing jurisdiction based on traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice is hardly unreasonable. Such a test
would give the economic exploitation standard the vitality it deserves.
Thus, it could be argued that National Bellas Hess represents an entirely
outmoded approach to the problem, an approach that the majority should
not have taken.
3 7
The dissent in the instant case is an express recognition that the
economic effect of an out-of-state seller's connection with the taxing state
relation to opportunities which it has given, to protection which it has afforded,
to benefits which it has conferred by the fact of being an orderly, civilized society.
311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940).
32. National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 761
(1967).
33. In Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 502, 506 (4th
Cir. 1956), it was said: "While the due process test applied to the problem of state
jurisdiction over non-residents for taxing purposes is not identical with the due
process test for the exercise over them of state judicial power, the two present a
close parallel." The distinction between these two concepts of jurisdiction is that
substantive or legislative jurisdiction is the permissible range within which a state
may create legal rights and duties, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 43 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1956), while judicial jurisdiction means the extent to which
a state's court may render valid judgments. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT
OF LAWS §§ 74-77 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1956).
34. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). There,
the Court intimated that taxation and service of process jurisdiction were closely
related if not coextensive when it noted that, "The activities which establish its
'presence' subject it alike to taxation by the state and to suit to recover the tax."
Id. at 321.
35. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
36. See notes 33 & 34 supra.
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should determine whether those connections are constitutionally sufficient
to allow a state to exercise jurisdiction over him for taxing purposes.
With respect to the "nexus" requirement for the imposition of the burden
of use tax collection, the Court should depart from its unwavering reliance
upon physical presence, and recognize the economic exploitation standard,
with the qualification that businesses dealing in a sporadic manner in a
state be excepted. It is clear that a large-scale mail order operation
enjoys the benefits of, and profits from, the facilities nurtured by the taxing
state as fully as if it had a retail store or maintained salesmen therein, 38 and
these benefits should not be enjoyed without their concomitant burdens.
James I. Ryan
EMINENT DOMAIN - MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT VALUATION
ASSEMBLED INDUSTRIAL PLANT DOCTRINE APPLIED TO EMINENT
DOMAIN PROCEEDINGS.
Gottus v. Redevelopment Authority (Pa. 1967)
Condemnees were the owners of a laundry and cleaning plant. When
they vacated the premises, they left behind cleaning and washing machines
which, while only bolted to the floor, required special plumbing and wiring.
Condemnees sought to fix the fair market value' of the premises at the
value of the cleaning plant in operation (which included the value of
the cleaning and washing machines) minus the value of those items which
they chose to remove.2 The condemnor argued that the cleaning and wash-
ing machines could easily have been removed without substantial damage to
the realty, were thus personal property, and should not be considered in
fixing the fair market value of the realty. The Board of View and the
trial court accepted the condemnees' approach and granted an award in-
cluding the machinery and equipment. On appeal, the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court, in a case of first impression, affirmed, holding that the
38. The economic exploitation standard was accepted by the Harvard Journal
on Legislation, in a proposed act which accepts the Scripto principle that regular and
continuous exploitation of a local market affords a sufficient basis for state taxation.
2 HARV. J. Lmcis. 167 (1965). The Act is designed to reduce the existing burden on
interstate business by: (1) limiting the number of returns a state may require each
year; (2) reimbursing the vendor for his collecting expenses; (3) shifting auditing
expenses to the taxing jurisdiction; (4) providing a relatively short period of limita-
tion, thus reducing the risk to the vendor of having to pay uncollected use taxes out
of his own pocket. But see H.R. 2158, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) ; Dane, supra
note 6.
1. "[Wlhat a willing buyer would pay in cash to a willing seller." United States
v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943). See also PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-603
(Supp. 1966).
2. These included clothes racks and pressing equipment.
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assembled industrial plant doctrine applies to eminent domain proceedings.
Gottus v. Redevelopment Authority, 425 Pa. 584, 229 A.2d 869 (1967).
The assembled industrial plant doctrine had its origin in the oft-quoted
"whether fast or loose" phrase of Chief Justice Gibson in Voorhis v. Free-
man,3 and prior to the instant decision was applied in two major areas
in Pennsylvania :4 the determination of priorities among competing mort-
gage interests, as in Voorhis,5 and in the area of real property tax assess-
ments.0 The doctrine makes physical annexation to the freehold irrelevant
as a critical factor in determining what is part of the realty. If machinery
and equipment fall within the doctrine's coverage, then, regardless of its
size or the ease and expense of its removal, it becomes a part of the realty.7
Reference to some of the more recent cases in those areas where the
doctrine has been applied will be helpful in predicting the scope of the
doctrine when applied to eminent domain proceedings. Initially, Chief
Justice Drew defined "industrial plant" in North Side Laundry v. Board
of Property Assessment when he stated:
By no stretch of the imagination could a bank building, a hotel, a
theater or any of the other business establishments referred to by
plaintiff8 be considered an industrial plant. It is true that we some-
times speak of "the movie industry," or "the hotel industry" or "the
banking industry", but that is merely a loose use of language to
convey the idea that the particular business is a sizable one. In
spite of that colloquialism, we do not speak of the buildings housing
such businesses as "industrial plants". . . . The law can do no better
than to define an industrial plant as that type of establishment which
the ordinary man thinks of as such.9
3. 2 W.&S. 116, 119 (Pa. 1841). "Whether fast or loose, therefore, all the
machinery of a manufactory which is necessary to constitute it, and without which
it would not be a manufactory at all, must pass for a part of the freehold." See
generally Leary, Financing New Machinery for Mortgaged Pennsylvania Industrial
Plants, 4 VILL. L. Rgv. 498 (1959) ; Robinson, McGough, and Scheinholtz, The Effect
of the Uniform Commercial Code on the Pennsylvania Industrial Plant Doctrine, 16
U. PiTT. L. REv. 89 (1955).
4. Less significant areas in which the doctrine has been applied are bankruptcy,
In re Taylor & Dean Mfg. Co., 136 F.2d 370 (3d Cir. 1943), and the rights of a
purchaser at a sheriff's sale, Central Lithograph Co. v. Eatmor Chocolate Co., 316
Pa. 300, 175 A. 697 (1934).
5. First Nat'l Bank v. Reichneder, 371 Pa. 463, 91 A.2d 277 (1952) ; Roos v.
Fairy Silk Mills, 334 Pa. 305, 5 A.2d 569 (1939) ; Morris's Appeal, 88 Pa. 368 (1879).
6. United States Steel Corp. v. County Bd. of Assessment & Revision of Taxes,
422 Pa. 463, 223 A.2d 92 (1966) ; Gordon Lubricating Co. v. Board of Property
Assessment, 204 Pa. Super. 441, 205 A.2d 704 (1964), aff'd iner., 418 Pa. 625, 211
A.2d 284 (1965) ; Jones & Laughlin Tax Assessment Case, 405 Pa. 421, 175 A.2d 856
(1961); United Laundries, Inc. v. Board of Property Assessment, 359 Pa. 195, 58
A.2d 833 (1948) ; Patterson v. Delaware County, 70 Pa. 381 (1872) ; School Dist. of
Falls Township Appeal, 31 Pa. D.&C.2d 109 (C.P. Bucks County 1962). But see
p. 220 & notes 11-13 infra, where machinery and equipment is specifically excluded
from tax assessment by statute.
7. The doctrine is broader than the traditional fixture doctrine under which
both intention and physical attachment are necessary elements. See American Laundry
Mach. Co. v. Miners Trust Co., 307 Pa. 395, 161 A. 306 (1932) ; Justice v. Nesque-
honing Valley R.R., 87 Pa. 28 (1878).
8. These included theaters, cab companies, service stations, auto repair com-
panies, restaurants, stores, office buildings, hotels, beauty shops, banks, and self-service
laundries (footnote added).
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In First Nat'l Bank v. Reichneder, Justice Stern discussed the doc-
trine's application to industrial mortgages:
[S]uch a mortgage does not include in its coverage everything used
in the operation of the business . . . but only such articles as are
contained in or about the premises and are essential to the manu-
facture of the product. . . . [T]he following cannot be held to have
been covered by the Bank's mortgage: flat-top desks, typewriters,
safe, checkwriter, chairs, adding machine, filing cabinet, and the five
trucks.10
More recently, in the Jones & Laughlin Tax Assessment Case," the
court, in construing and upholding an amendment to the local real estate
assessment law, 12 held that machinery and equipment used directly in
the manufacturing process and used solely for effectuating that purpose
are excluded from real estate assessment and taxation.
13
The Pennsylvania Eminent Domain Code 14 did not take effect until
June 22, 1964, and applies to all condemnations effected after that date.
The condemnation in the Gottus decision occurred prior to the effective
date of the Code and thus was decided under the applicable pre-Code law.
The decision, however, applies to condemnations which are now governed
by the Code. As such, three sections of the Code will be particularly af-
fected by the application of the doctrine to eminent domain proceedings.
Section 1-603(3) 15 speaks of machinery and equipment which form part
of the real estate, but does not say what machinery and equipment form
part of the real estate. Section 1-60716 pertains to removal of machinery
10. 371 Pa. 463, 471, 91 A.2d 277, 280 (1952).
11. 405 Pa. 421, 175 A.2d 856 (1961).
12. The amendment applies to the fourth to eighth class county assessment law
and provides:
[Miachinery tools, appliances and other equipment contained in any mill, mine,
manufactory or industrial establishment shall not be considered or included as
part of the real estate in determining the value of such mill, mine, manufactory
or industrial establishment.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 5453.201 (Supp. 1966). Similar acts excluding machinery
and equipment from real property tax assessments in Pittsburgh and Philadelphia
were previously enacted. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 15976, 23104 (1957). See Gulf
Oil Corp. v. City of Philadelphia, 357 Pa. 101, 53 A.2d 250 (1947).
13. While the application of the industrial plant doctrine to eminent domain
proceedings benefits the condemnee by inclusion of the machinery and equipment in
the real estate, those industrial property owners that qualify under the statutes in
note 12 supra benefit as taxpayers by exclusion of the machinery and equipment from
the real estate when it is assessed for taxing purposes.
14. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 1-101 to 1-903 (Supp. 1966).
15. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-603(3) (Supp. 1966) provides:
Fair market value shall be the price which would be agreed to by a willing
and informed seller and buyer, taking into consideration, but not limited to, the
following factors:
(3) The machinery, equipment and fixtures forming part of the real estate
(emphasis added).
16. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-607 (Supp. 1966) provides:
In the event the condemnor does not require for its use machinery, equipment
or fixtures forming part of the real estate, it shall so notify the condemnee. The
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and equipment, while section 1-60817 provides a new element of condem-
nation law - awarding as a separate item of damages the cost of removal,
transportation, and reinstallation for those items which are not considered
to be a part of the condemned real estate. After the effective date of
the Code and prior to the instant decision, the practice was that machinery
and equipment which easily could be removed without substantial damage
to the freehold was removed and removal-transportation-reinstallation
expenses were paid by the condemnor pursuant to section 1-608. For that
machinery and equipment which was substantially attached to the freehold
and which could not be easily removed, the owner was given its fair
market value in accordance with section 1-603.18 The Gottus decision
has the apparent effect of broadly defining the heretofore undefined statu-
tory phrase "forming part of the real estate."'9
The Gottus court quoted from Jackson v. New York 20 to explain
why it was appropriate to apply the industrial plant doctrine to eminent
domain proceedings. 2 ' In Jackson, the New York court wanted to avoid
the condemnor discharging the full measure of its duty by providing com-
pensation for the condemned land alone without regard to the machinery
and equipment which was on the land. Although the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court was justifiably concerned with this problem of the con-
demnor destroying the economic integrity of the condemnee in the pre-
Code Gottus condemnation, the concern is no longer appropriate in light
of section 1-60822 of the Pennsylvania Eminent Domain Code which re-
quires the condemnor to pay a removal-transportation-reinstallation award
to the condemnee. Thus, it can be forcefully argued that the Pennsylvania
General Assembly intended to preserve the condemnee's economic integ-
rity by requiring the condemnee to remove his machinery and equipment
at the expense of the condemnor. The instant decision greatly undermines
this apparent intention.
The application of the doctrine to eminent domain proceedings will
not be without ramifications. The landlord-tenant relationship in an indus-
trial setting provides an excellent example. It is rare to find an industrial
condemnee may within thirty days of such notice elect to remove said machinery,
equipment or fixtures, unless the time be extended by the condemnor. If the con-
demnee so elects, the damages shall be reduced by the fair market value thereof
severed from the real estate.
17. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-608 (Supp. 1966) provides:
The person having legal possession of machinery, equipment or fixtures on
the condemned property, not forming part of the realty, including a tenant not
entitled to any proceeds of the condemnation, if under the lease the tenant has
the right to remove said machinery, equipment or fixtures, shall be entitled, as
damages, to the reasonable expenses of the removal, transportation and reinstalla-
tion of such machinery, equipment or fixtures. Reasonable expenses under the
provisions of this section shall not exceed twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000)
and in no event shall such expenses exceed the market value of the machinery,
equipment and fixtures.
18. See note 15 supra.
19. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-603(3) (Supp. 1966).
20. 213 N.Y. 34, 106 N.E. 758 (1914).
21. 425 Pa. at 588-89, 229 A.2d at 872.
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lease in Pennsylvania without a "condemnation clause. '28  The validity
of such clauses has been upheld 24 and they have the effect of eliminating
the possibility of the lessee receiving a condemnation award for his unex-
pired leasehold interest. Another common feature of industrial leases is
a "removal clause" as a result of which the lessee relinquishes his right to
remove the machinery and equipment which he installed during his tenancy.
If the condemnee has not relinquished his right of removal, he can receive
a removal-transportation-reinstallation award under section 1-608 of the
Code.25 However, where the lessee has relinquished his right of removal,
the machinery and equipment he had installed will remain with the free-
hold and become the property of the owner of the freehold. If the ma-
chinery and equipment is then considered as part of the realty, the owner
will be given its fair market value pursuant to section 1-603.26 This award
for the real estate, which includes the tenant's former machinery and
equipment, can only benefit the tenant when he has a sufficient leasehold
interest and when he has not executed a condemnation clause in conjunc-
tion with the removal clause. In this situation, the tenant will share
the condemnation award with the landlord, the tenant's percentage depend-
ing on the extent of his leasehold interest. Where there is neither a
condemnation nor a removal clause the doctrine should apply to the
tenant's benefit, enabling him to claim a greater interest in the con-
demned property and, therefore, a larger percentage of the condemnation
award.27 A possible consequence of Gottus is that industrial tenants will
be more reluctant to waive their rights, resulting in arduous negotiation
of condemnation and removal clauses in industrial leases.
2 8
Another ramification of the application of the doctrine to eminent
domain will arise as a result of the holding in Dyer v. Commonwealth.29
In Dyer the condemnor was ordered to pay for the value of the land
plus the house on it, even though the house had been physically removed
23. The clause has two important points:
(1) The lease terminates as of the date of condemnation.
(2) The lessee relinquishes all claims against the lessor. Occasionally,
the lease will also state that the lessee waives all claims against
the condemnor.
24. Scholl's Appeal, 292 Pa. 262, 141 A. 44 (1928). Not only was the clause
upheld as between the lessor and the lessee, but the court said that a third party (the
condemnor) could take advantage of its terms and use it as a defense in an action
for damages.
25. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-608 (Supp. 1966), conditions receipt of removal
expenses upon the right of the tenant to remove.
26. See note 15 supra.
27. For an excellent discussion of the conflicting claims for damages upon con-
demnation see Snitzer, Slicing the Condemnation Pie: Compensable Interests Under
Eminent Domain in Pennsylvania, 9 VILL. L. REv. 250 (1964). See also 4 P. NIcHOLS,
LAW Op EMINENT DOMAIN 211-20 (3d ed. 1951); 1 L. ORCEL, VALUATION UNER
EMINENT DOMAIN 524-28 (2d ed. 1953).
28. Prior to Gottus, where machinery and equipment in industrial plants were
not easily removable and, hence, considered part of the real estate, tenants had rights
to condemnation awards, but frequently waived these rights by executing leases with
condemnation and removal clauses. The sheer increase in the number of cases, where,
because of Gottus, the machinery and equipment will be considered as part of the real
estate, should cause industrial tenants to be more reluctant to waive these rights.
29. 396 Pa. 524, 152 A.2d 760 (1959).
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to another location by the condemnee subsequent to the acquisition of
title by the condemnor3 0 Accordingly, a condemnor will be placed in a
difficult situation with respect to easily removable machinery and equipment
that is left behind pursuant to the condemnee's allegation that it falls
within the doctrine. Although the condemnor will undoubtedly sell the
machinery and equipment as quickly as possible,3 ' there invariably will be
a lapse of time between the condemnation and the public sale. If the
machinery and equipment is stolen during this period, the condemnor will,
of Gourse, not be able to sell it and apply the proceeds to the condemnee's
damage award, assuming that the condemnee later prevails at trial.
Even if the condemnor prevails at trial, he may be liable to the condemnee
for the fair market value of the machinery and equipment as a result of
breaching his duty of care as an involuntary bailee.
3 2
Perhaps an even greater burden falls on the relocating condemnee88
who must decide whether to claim his machinery and equipment under
the doctrine or to waive the doctrine and seek removal-transportation-
reinstallation expenses under section 1-60834 of the Code. If he avails
himself of the doctrine and is successful at trial, he will, in accord with
the instant decision and section 1-603 of the Code,"5 receive the fair
market value of his land, including the machinery and equipment. But
if he loses at trial, his decision may have been a costly one. When he left
his machinery and equipment behind as allegedly within the scope of the
doctrine the condemnor took title to the land and possession of the
machinery and equipment. By taking possession of the machinery and
equipment the condemnor may have become an involuntary bailee.8 6
30. Where the property is removed by the condemnee as in Dyer, the condemnor
has an action against the condemnee for the value of the property, but if the property
were stolen by an unknown party, the condemnor would still have to pay for the
property without any means of recouping its value.
31. See p. 224 & note 39 infra.
32. See note 36 infra. The trend of modern judicial opinion is to require the
gratuitous (involuntary) bailee to exercise reasonable care with respect to the bailed
property. See 8 AM. JUR. 2d Bailhnents §§ 204, 210 (1963).
33. One comprehensive report indicates that 89% of those businesses and in-
dustrial establishments which are condemned do relocate. COMMUNITY RENEWAL
PROGRAM, CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, TECH. REP. No. 19, RELOCATION or BUsINESS AND
INDUSTRIAL FIRMS, table A-1 (1966). See also H. ZIMMER, REBUILDING CITEs: THE
EFFECTS or DISPLACEMENT AND RELOCATION ON SMALL BUSINESS (1964).
34. See note 17 supra.
35. See note 15 supra.
36. The law will create an involuntary or constructive bailment where one comes
into bona fide possession of the property of another. See Foulke v. New York Consol.
R.R., 228 N.Y. 269, 127 N.E. 237 (1920) ; Burns v. State, 145 Wisc. 373, 128 N.W.
987 (1910). See also State v. Carr, 118 N.J.L. 233, 234, 192 A. 36, 37 (Ct. Err. &
App. 1937), in which the court said:
[Tihere is also a class of bailments, quasi contractual in nature, which arise by
operation of law "where, otherwise than by a mutual contract of bailment, one
person has lawfully acquired the possession of personal property of another and
holds it under circumstances whereby he ought, upon principles of justice, to
keep it safely and restore it or deliver it to the owner .
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In a situation analogous to one where a condemnee vacates and
leaves his machinery and equipment behind, the court in Grice v. Berkner"7
held that the party who came into possession of the property was an
involuntary depository of it and had a duty to care for it. This duty
can be satisfied by the condemnor storing the machinery and equipment.a
However, a more reasonable method of satisfying this duty would be for
the condemnor to immediately sell the machinery and equipment at public
sale.A9 The condemnee could hardly object to public sale since he will have
no further use for the machinery and equipment, and subjecting him to
storage expenses would be against his best interests. Thus, a relocating
condemnee by his decision to leave the machinery and equipment behind
will have had to purchase new machinery and equipment, and having been
unsuccessful in establishing the doctrine's applicability, the proceeds of the
public sale will be of little consolation to him in light of the fact that he
could have had his old machinery and equipment moved to his new loca-
tion at no expense to him.
Another conceivable and even more costly alternative when the con-
demnee chooses not to remove his machinery and equipment and later
loses at trial is that it may be considered abandoned property40 as a
result of which no compensation would inure to the condemnee. 41 While
a proponant of this theory may have some difficulty proving intent to
abandon,42 the question is one of fact and depends on the particular cir-
cumstances involved.
43
The application of the assembled industrial plant doctrine to eminent
domain proceedings foreshadows an increased amount of complex litiga-
37. 148 Minn. 64, 180 N.W. 923 (1921). The involuntary depository, the new
owner of the land, wanted to clear the land and rebuild. He stored the personal
property left on the land by the former owner and was permitted to recover com-
pensation from the former owner for the storage expenses incurred. Thus, if the
condemnor stored the machinery and equipment and the condemnee lost at trial, the
condemnee would presumably be held accountable for storage charges.
38. See note 37 supra.
39. In such a situation, as long as the sale was held in good faith, the condemnee
could not complain regarding the proceeds of the sale. See Consolidated Ice Co. v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 224 Pa. 487, 73 A. 937 (1909). Selling at a public sale presents
many problems. Initially, it is often difficult to get bidders. Furthermore, a require-
ment that the successful bidder remove the property from the condemned premises
will dissuade prospective bidders. Additionally, it would be anomalous if the con-
demnee bought back the very same machinery and equipment for use in his new
plant at a price substantially lower than that which he will claim at the trial is
their fair market value. The requirement that the condemnor take sealed bids pre-
cludes the condemnee's exclusion from the sale.
40. This notion of abandonment is similar to the situation where a tenant leaves
property on the premises, which he had a right to remove, beyond the time period in
which he was permitted to remove it. In such a case it becomes the property of the
landowner. Donnelly v. Frick & Lindsay Co., 207 Pa. 579, 57 A. 60 (1904) ; Albert
v. Uhrich, 180 Pa. 283, 36 A. 745 (1897) ; Hill v. Sewald, 53 Pa. 271 (1867).
41. See State v. Gallant, 42 N.J. 583, 202 A.2d 401 (1964) ; American Salvage
Co. v. Housing Authority, 14 N.J. 271, 102 A.2d 465 (1953).
42. See Llewellyn v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 308 Pa. 497,
162 A. 429 (1932).
43. Thus, the fact that the condemnee could have removed the machinery and
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tion. The doctrine itself is undefined and replete with equitable over-
tones which have long outlived the occasions which gave rise to their
creation. 44 In addition to the need to define it, very specific attention must
be given to the doctrine's effect on the Pennsylvania Eminent Domain
Code. The official comment to section 1-608 reads in part:
This section adds a new element of damages in eminent domain
cases.45 There is nothing in existing law which gives a condemnee
or the tenant of a condemnee the right to recover as a separate item
of damages, removal, transportation and reinstallation expenses of
machinery, equipment and fixtures which are on the condemned prop-
erty but which are not a part of the real estate.
46
This novel provision for removal, transportation, and reinstallation ex-
penses was introduced to provide an equitable and complete solution to
the complicated problem of distributing costs in condemnation proceedings.
The additional introduction of the assembled industrial plant doctrine
into eminent domain proceedings now governed by the recently enacted
Eminent Domain Code will not only compound the complexity of these
proceedings, but also may frustrate the legislative purpose to define the
condemnee's damages in terms of section 1-60 8 's provisions.
47
Ian Karl Portnoy
FEDERAL COURTS - MANDAMUS - FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT
LACKS JURISDICTION TO GRANT MANDAMUS PROCEDURES AVAILABLE
UNDER STATE LAW.
Stern v. South Chester Tube Co. (3d Cir. 1967)
Plaintiffs, stockholders of the defendant corporation, instituted a diver-
sity action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania to compel the corporate officials to permit them to examine
the share register, books of account, and other corporate records. The
District Court dismissed their complaint for lack of jurisdiction,' and
appeal was taken to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
44. See Leary, supra note 3, at 498.
45. In the great majority of cases in other jurisdictions, and in Pennsylvania
prior to the enactment of the Code, the condemnee was not entitled to compensation
for removal expenses (footnote added). See Annot., 69 A.L.R.2d 1454 (1960), and
cases cited therein.
46. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-608 (Supp. 1966) (Comment - Joint State
Gov't Comm'n 1964 Report).
47. See p. 221 & note 17 supra.
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Circuit. The dismissal was affirmed, the court holding that an action to
examine company records, though enforceable in the state courts through
a writ of mandamus, is not maintainable in the federal courts because of
their limited jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus. Stern v. South
Chester Tube Co., 378 F.2d 205 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. granted, 36 U.S.L.W.
3167 (U.S. Oct. 24, 1967) (No. 487).
The conclusion reached by the circuit court in Stern is virtually iden-
tical to that of a federal district court in New York in the recent case of
Neuwirth v. Merin.2 There, while granting the defendant corporation's
motion for an order requiring that the plaintiff shareholder deposit security
for expenses in a derivative suit, pursuant to a New York statute,3 the
court denied the plaintiff's cross-motion to compel the defendant to produce
the shareholder list so that the plaintiff would have the opportunity to
bring other shareholders into the action and thus avoid the burden of
raising the security. 4 While admitting the severity of its ruling and that
the lack of power to issue writs of mandamus in the federal courts has been
criticized on more than one occasion,5 the court expressed the opinion that
the law on this subject has been so well settled that any change would have
to be made by congressional enactment rather than by judicial legislation.6
Despite the positions taken by these two courts, the law may not be
as well settled as they indicate. Within the last year, the same Pennsyl-
vania district court which refused relief in Stern7 successfully aided another
complaining shareholder who sought to examine corporate records. In
Susquehanna Corp. v. General Refractories Co.8 the court felt empowered
to issue an injunction prohibiting the corporation from completing the
contested transaction until it had furnished the plaintiff with the informa-
tion requested, even though it might not have the jurisdiction to issue a
writ of mandamus ordering that the material be turned over.9 By giving
relief in the form of a prohibitory injunction, rather than a writ of man-
2. 267 F. Supp. 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
3. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 627 (McKinney Supp. 1967).
4. In stockholders' derivative actions in New York state courts the plaintiff can
generally obtain, upon a cross motion to defendant's motion for posting of security,
an order for the production of the stockholder list. Auerbach v. Shafstor, Inc., 34
Misc. 2d 658, 229 N.Y.S.2d 927 (Sup. Ct. 1962), aff'd, 19 App. Div. 2d 531, 240
N.Y.S.2d 146, appeal dismissed, 13 N.Y.2d 891, 243 N.Y.S.2d 673, 193 N.E.2d 501
(1963). By convincing the requisite number of shareholders to join in the derivative
suit, the plaintiff may avoid the security for expenses requirement. N.Y. Bus. CORP.
LAW § 627 (McKinney Supp. 1967).
5. The court characterized the situation as "an outworn technicality" in Marshall
v. Crotty, 185 F.2d 622, 627 (1st Cir. 1950), and as "an unrealistic anomaly" in Stern
v. South Chester Tube Co., 252 F. Supp. 329, 332 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
6. 267 F. Supp. at 336.
7. 252 F. Supp. 329 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
8. 250 F. Supp. 797 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
9. Plaintiff charged that the defendant directors were about to embark on a
planned sale of the corporate assets which would result in a wrongful dilution of
plaintiff's proportional interest in the corporation. It asked the court to enjoin the
proposed transaction and to require that the directors provide a list of stockholders so
that the plaintiff could communicate with them concerning the transaction. While the
court decided that it could not order the defendants to turn over the stockholder
list, it did grant an injunction preventing any meeting on the subject until the defend-
ants provided the plaintiff with the information it needed.
[VOL. 13
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damus, the court arrived at a solution which neither the court in Stern
nor Neuwirth thought it could reach.
The fact that a federal court can grant relief in one instance and
refuse it in a basically similar situation stems primarily from the multi-
faceted nature of the equitable powers available to the court. Generally,
where there is no adequate remedy at law, courts have the power to grant
equitable relief in order to protect persons or property from injury.10
Such relief may take the form of a command by the court to refrain from
doing certain acts," or, where the relief is mandatory in form, it may be
a command to take certain steps required by the court.' 2 Although some
courts are reluctant to issue mandatory injunctions and occasionally restrict
their use to extraordinary circumstances,'" it is generally recognized that
an equity court can decree mandatory as well as prohibitory relief.1 4 The
difficult problem arises where a federal court is requested to issue a man-
datory injunction in circumstances where mandamus, a separate and dis-
tinct remedy, would be appropriate.
Mandamus is broadly defined as a writ, given by a court of competent
jurisdiction, directed to a person, corporation, officer, or inferior court,
commanding the performance of a particular duty which results from the
official station of the one to whom it is directed or from the operation of
law.' 5 This particular type of writ, commanding the performance of a
legal duty, traditionally has been regarded as a legal rather than an equitable
proceeding,' 6 and federal courts have no jurisdiction to issue mandamus
in the absence of constitutional or statutory provisions granting such
power. 1 7 This writ is to be distinguished from a mandatory injunction
which is equitable in nature and is appropriately issued against any defend-
ant who may act or refrain from acting in an unjust, inequitable, or in-
jurious manner, and where there is no adequate remedy available at law.' 8
The jurisdictional restriction against federal court issuance of writs of
mandamus in original proceedings' 9 has been extended by many courts to
10. Ladner v. Siegel, 298 Pa. 487, 495, 148 A. 699, 701 (1930).
11. E.g., Schubach v. McDonald, 179 Mo. 163, 78 S.W. 1020, appeal dismissed,
196 U.S. 644 (1905).
12. E.g., Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Carey, 80 Conn. 426, 68 A. 993 (1908).
13. Lyle v. Chicago, 357 Ill. 41, 191 N.E. 255 (1934).
14. E.g., Bowles v. Skaggs, 151 F.2d 817 (6th Cir. 1945) ; Allen v. Stowell, 145
Cal. 666, 79 P. 371 (1905) ; Thompson v. North, 191 Okla. 356, 129 P.2d 1011 (1942).
15. City of Hickory v. Catawba County, 206 N.C. 165, 173, 173 S.E. 56, 61 (1934).
For an historical treatment of mandamus see Weintraub, Prerogative Writ: Certiorari
and Mandamus, 9 N.Y.L.F. 478 (1963); Note, Mandatory Injunctions as Substitutes
for Writs of Mandamus in the Fed. Dist. Cts.: A Study in Procedural Manipulation,
38 COLUm. L. Rtv. 903 (1938).
16. Washington v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 1 F.2d 327 (W.D. Wash. 1924);
Maryland Cas. Co. v. Leland, 214 N.C. 235, 199 S.E. 7 (1938).
17. Graham v. Norton, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 427 (1873).
18. See Alabama v. United States, 304 F.2d 583, 590, aff'd, 371 U.S. 37 (1962);
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 923 (4th ed. 1951).
19. Since McIntire v. Wood, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 504 (1813), federal district
courts have lacked jurisdiction to issue original writs of mandamus. The Court in
Mclntire, interpreting sections 11 and 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, held that
mandamus, a prerogative writ in England, was not a writ in law or equity and could
therefore be granted only in aid of otherwise established jurisdiction. Cf. Graham
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include mandatory injunctions which would have the effect of, or be equiva-
lent to, mandamus. 20 In such cases the restrictions on the federal court's
power to issue writs of mandamus are thereby extended to the area of
injunctive relief.
This is particularly significant, for, while the writ of mandamus as
such has been abolished by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 21 and
replaced by an order in the nature of mandamus, such relief may be ex-
tended only if the remedy of mandamus would have been available before
the adoption of 81(b) .22 The court of appeals in Stern held that the relief
available in place of mandamus is governed by the All Writs Act, which
gives federal courts the power to issue all writs "necessary . . . in aid of
their . . . jurisdictions .... ,,"3 Citing decisions to the effect that a federal
court is without the authority to issue a writ of mandamus "except in aid
of its jurisdiction already acquired under an applicable federal statute,
'24
the court concluded that, since the only relief requested by the plaintiff
was an order which would allow him to examine the defendant corpora-
tion's records, the issuance of such relief would not be in aid of jurisdiction
already acquired, and therefore not within the power of a federal court.
This analysis makes jurisdiction dependent upon the nature of the
relief to be granted and thereby precludes jurisdiction in all cases where a
request is made solely for relief in the nature of mandamus. However, it
may be argued, as it was in the three cases being considered, that juris-
diction had been acquired by reason of the diversity of citizenship of the
parties.25 Furthermore, each of the plaintiffs had a state law right of access
to stockholder lists and corporate books .2  Since diversity of citizenship
Columbia may grant original mandamus. Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.)
524 (1838).
20. Miguel v. McCarl, 291 U.S. 442 (1934) ; Smith v. Bourbon County, 127 U.S.
105 (1888) ; Johnson v. Interstate Power Co., 187 F. Supp. 36 (D.S.D. 1960), noted
in 14 STAN. L. REV. 167 (1961). The note lists 27 cases since 1947 in which original
mandamus has been denied for jurisdictional reasons. The Johnson court said that it
would look through the substance of the complaint to see if the relief demanded was
mandamus, even though a mandatory injunction had been requested.
21. FED. R. Civ. P. 81(b) provides: "The writs of scire facias and mandamus
are abolished. Relief heretofore available by mandamus or scire facias may be
obtained by appropriate action or by appropriate motion under the practice prescribed
in these rules."
22. Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. Republican Co., 188 F. Supp. 813 (D. Mass.
1960).
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1964).
24. 378 F.2d at 206.
25. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1964) provides that: "The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the
sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between - (1) citizens
of different States .. "
26. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1308B (1967) ; N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 627
(McKinney Supp. 1967). A Pennsylvania court held in Goldman v. Trans-United
Indus., 404 Pa. 288, 290, 171 A.2d 788, 790 (1961), that its statute was merely a
codification of the rights of inspection given a shareholder under the common law.
The common law would extend the right of inspection to books, papers, and records
generally, including correspondence, minutes, books, and other instruments. 5 W.
FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 2239 (rev. vol. 1952).
Cf. Nationwide Corp. v. Northwestern Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 251 Minn. 255, 87 N.W.2d
671 (1958), noted, in 28 U. CINc. L. REv. 116 (1959) (holding that relief should
be granted unless improper purpose is shown).
[VOL. 13
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had been shown, the plaintiffs argued that the federal courts in question
should extend relief consonant with that extant in state practice. The
court of appeals in Stern replied that this could not be done since diversity
jurisdiction is limited to civil actions,27 and mandamus is not a civil action,
but a special proceeding in which a court is called upon to exercise its
prerogative power.28 It may be argued, however, that a proceeding for
relief in the nature of mandamus is a civil action, especially in instances
such as this where a stockholder is seeking to inspect corporate records. 29
In Susquehanna the district court bypassed the above limitation upon
mandamus by asserting authority to act when the appropriate state remedy
is inadequate.30 The state mandamus procedure would merely entail an
order compelling the inspection, and the court felt that if this were done
the corporation could allow the inspection, and while the plaintiff was
contacting the required number of shareholders needed to prevent cor-
porate action, consummate such action.31 It therefore enjoined the trans-
action until the plaintiff both received the information it needed and had
time to circulate its views among the other stockholders.3 2 By issuing a
prohibitory injunction the court avoided the problem of whether a federal
court can grant a writ of mandamus, 33 but it left the plaintiff stockholder
with only partial relief, since the most appropriate remedy would include
both an order to turn over the records and an injunction to restrain the
contested transaction.34 By proceeding in this way it also allowed other
courts, such as the district court in Stern, to distinguish its decision on
the basis of the peculiar need for prohibitory relief.
3 5
While Susquehanna does not provide a solution to the problems in-
herent in granting mandamus relief to stockholders such as those in Stern
and Neuwirth, it does reveal a flaw in the opinion expressed in Stern that
27. 378 F.2d at 206.
28. Id. See note 19 supra.
29. H. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 166 (rev. ed. 1946). The author notes that
mandamus, when used to enforce writs of inspection, is "essentially only a civil action
between private parties .... Id. at 386.
30. Susquehanna Corp. v. General Refractories Co., 250 F. Supp. 797, 801 (E.D.
Pa. 1966), citing Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. W. I. Southern, Inc., 306 U.S. 563 (1939),
which recognized that federal equitable relief will be issued if a state remedy does
not adequately provide relief equivalent to the traditional remedy in equity.
31. Plaintiff needed time to formulate a position on the transaction and to
circulate a proxy statement in opposition to the one already drafted by the defendants.
This is a valid purpose for inspection under Pennsylvania law. Goldman v. Trans-
United Indus., 404 Pa. 288, 292, 171 A.2d 788, 791 (1961).
32. Cf. Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. W. I. Southern, Inc., 306 U.S. 563, 568, 569 (1939)
(allowing federal district courts equity power to grant relief to those plaintiffs who
come under their jurisdiction) ; Steinberg v. American Bantam Car Co., 76 F. Supp.
426, 441 (W.D. Pa. 1948) (ruling that a federal court has the right to supervise and
control corporate elections in order to prevent unfairness).
33. Defendant claimed that it was merely a disingenuous way of circumventing
the inability of federal courts to issue mandamus. Brief for defendant at 38, Susque-
hanna Corp. v. General Refractories Co., 250 F. Supp. 797 (E.D. Pa. 1966). Cf.
Fineran v. Bailey, 2 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1924) (holding that what a federal court
cannot do directly, it should not do by means of an injunction).
34. A Pennsylvania state court could grant mandamus under PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15, § 1308B (1967), and an injunction, in accord with Hagy v. Premier Mfg.
Corp., 404 Pa. 330, 172 A.2d 283 (1961).
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the law on the question of mandatory relief to stockholders seeking orders
to review corporate records from federal courts is settled. The impact of
Susquehanna is amplified when it is realized that in a corporate context
almost any action which can be stated in terms of a plea for mandatory
relief can also be stated in terms of a plea for prohibitory relief.80
This is not the first time federal courts have managed to circumvent
the prohibitions upon their jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, and
the technique used in Susquehanna is but one of the methods which have
been employed.8 7 A method which strikes closer to the crux of the prob-
lem was employed in Johnson v. Interstate Power Co., 8s where a district
court explained that it had the authority to issue mandatory injunctions
unless they were in the nature of a "true" mandamus. Courts originally
defined mandamus as a prerogative writ of extraordinary character used
to force public officials to perform their duties,3 9 and the restrictions upon
the federal courts' power to issue writs of mandamus were enacted to
prevent the federal judiciary from exercising their jurisdiction in questions
of local government administration. 40 Today, relief in the nature of man-
damus is appropriate in situations which were never contemplated when
the original restrictions upon its use were devised. 4' Therefore, the advisa-
bility of extending the restrictions upon mandamus to these new situations
is doubtful.4 2 Judge Ganey, in his dissent in Stern, recognized this fact,
and proposed that notwithstanding existing authority against the employ-
36. By issuing a restraining injunction the court follows the distinction other
courts have made between mandamus and an ordinary injunction, that is, that man-
danmus is an order for someone to undo his wrongful act, while an injunction is a
prohibition of a threatened wrongful act. Mitchell v. Jewish Progressive Club, 253
Ala. 195, 43 So. 2d 529 (1949); cf. Annot., 20 A.L.R.2d 344, 387-99 (1951). How-
ever, the result is the same, and if a mandatory injunction is equivalent to mandamus
so is this prohibitory injunction. See Developments in the Law - Injunctions, 78
HARV. L. REv. 994 (1965):
To the extent that mandatory and prohibitory represent semantic opposites, ally
rule based upon them is ridiculously easy to circumvent. The "mandatory" injunc-
tion has not yet been devised which could not be stated in "prohibitory" terms.
Id. at 1062.
37. Davis, Mandatory Relief from Administrative Action in the Federal Courts,
22 U. CHI. L. REv. 585 (1955).
38. 187 F. Supp. 36, 39-40 (D.S.D. 1960). While Johnson defined "true man-
damus" as an order requiring affirmative action which is addressed to public officials,
public utilities and corporations, it seems that the definition should be less extensive.
39. H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
1180-86 (1953). The authors treat the analogous situation of mandatory actions
against the government. In 1962, Congress solved this problem by providing district
courts with mandamus jurisdiction in actions against officials of the United States
government. 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1966).
40. H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
1180-86 (1953).
41. See 2 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1004 (2d ed. 1961), wherein the
author points out that until the advent of the S.E.C. proxy rules there was little reason
for anyone to attempt to review corporate elections in the federal courts.
42. Davis, Mandatory Relief from Administrative Action in the Federal Courts,
22 U. CHI. L. Rev. 585 (1955). Professor Davis, noting that the need for mandatory
relief in regard to administrative proceedings had greatly expanded, suggests that
federal courts be allowed jurisdiction to issue mandamus against federal officials.
In 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW §§ 23.09-.11 (1958), the author asserts that
there are no valid reasons for denying jurisdiction to issue mandamus relief against
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ment of mandamus by the federal courts, authority to issue such writs
could be found under the rule of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins.43 He felt that
federal courts must be able to meet the "growing needs of the substantive
rights embodied in state statutes and grant a remedy, if one is provided
by state statutes, as in our case, and, even in its absence, fashion a remedy
of its own under its inherent equity power."
44
The solution to this problem may lie in the realization by the courts
that the restrictions upon mandamus in federal courts are not appropriately
applicable to the relief being sought in the present case, and there is noth-
ing which necessitates applying them. While the Supreme Court has
recognized the existence of the restrictions,4 5 it has never let them cut
deeply into the separate equitable remedies given in the form of injunc-
tions.46 It has been the rule to uphold the right of district courts to grant
both prohibitory and mandatory injunctions under appropriate circum-
stances.47 In fact, the Supreme Court specifically allowed their use in
cases like Susquehanna where the form of the language is prohibitory while
the substance is mandatory,48 thereby allowing district courts to evade
mandamus restrictions. The reason for this is that there is a distinct tradi-
tion of equitable relief which must be viewed separately from that of man-
damus relief,4 9 and it is suggested that this distinction should be the basis
for relief in this case and all other cases where "true" mandamus is
not involved.
The area of equitable relief has been vastly extended in recent years
to meet the demands of an increasingly complex society.50 Not only
43. 378 F.2d at 207-08 (dissenting opinion), citing Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64 (1938). Judge Ganey does not meet the argument that mandamus is not a
civil action. See note 29 supra, concerning a possible solution to this problem.
44. 378 F.2d at 208 (dissenting opinion). The court in Susquehanna suggested
that there would be a special problem when a state mandamus statute is appealed
to under Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The "remedy" of mandamus
may be a matter of substantive state law which the diversity court would be bound
to apply. 250 F. Supp. at 802. It would seem important to insure that a diversity
plaintiff gets no less relief in a federal court than he would in the state court. Cf.
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
45. The unfortunate situation today arises out of the fact that many district
courts have followed those decisions of the Supreme Court holding that federal courts
generally do not have jurisdiction to issue mandamus relief. E.g., Palmer v. Walsh,
78 F. Supp. 64 (D. Ore. 1948) following White v. Berry, 171 U.S. 366 (1898). Note
that the White case dealt with the removal of an executive official.
46. Cases like White v. Berry, 171 U.S. 366 (1898), discussed in note 45 supra,
are the exception rather than the rule, and are contrary to the general practice of the
Supreme Court. See Porter v. Lee, 328 U.S. 246, 251 (1946) ; Johnson v. Yellow Cab
Transit Co., 321 U.S. 383 (1944) ; Virginia Ry. v. System Fed'n 40, Ry. Employees,
AFL, 300 U.S. 515, 551 (1937) ; Ex parte Lennon, 166 U.S. 548, 556 (1897) ; Davis,
Mandatory Relief from Administrative Action in the Federal Courts, 22 U. CHI. L.
Riv. 585, 589 (1955).
47. See note 42 supra.
48. American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94 (1902),
held that a district court had the jurisdiction to enjoin a postmaster from enforcing
a fraud order which had the effect of compelling him to deliver mail to the com-
plainant. Accord, Stanford v. Lunde Arms Corp., 211 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1954).
49. See United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326, 333 (1952).
50. Developments in the Law - Injunctions, 78 HARv. L. Rv. 994 (1965). "The
expanding role of the injunctions is partly due to the attractiveness of so flexible a
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administrative organs of the government, but independent organizations
such as corporations must be brought within the control of federal as well
as state courts.5 ' It is not necessary that legislation be enacted to make
this possible, for where a federal court has jurisdiction by reason of a
proper diversity claim it should be able to exercise its full equitable powers
to grant relief. If the claim is valid the form of the remedy should not
matter,52 certainly not enough to justify granting relief in Susquehanna
and denying it in Stern and Neuwirth. It should not matter that the
equitable relief requested resembles a mandamus procedure which has been
restricted in the past, not to prevent federal courts from exercising control
over corporations, but primarily to prevent them from interfering with the
functioning of state government, courts, and officials.
James A. Burger
LABOR LAW - REMEDIAL ORDERS - PURCHASER'S LIABILITY FOR
PREDECESSOR'S UNFAIR PRACTICES - DUTY TO REINSTATE WITH
BACK PAY.
Perma Vinyl Corp. (N.L.R.B. 1967)
In April, 1965, Perma Vinyl Corporation was directed by the
National Labor Relations Board to offer immediate reinstatement to four
employees who had previously been dismissed and to compensate five
others for the pay losses suffered by them through the corporation's
unfair labor practices. Following that hearing, U.S. Pipe & Foundry
Company, with full knowledge of its seller's labor liabilities, purchased
Perma Vinyl's facilities and operated the same without substantial change;
that is, the operations continued at the same location with the same
supervisors directing the old Perma Vinyl employees. Perma Vinyl paid
the workers the back pay owed them from the date of their wrongful
discharge to the date of the sale to U.S. Pipe. This precipitated the ques-
tion of U.S. Pipe's responsibility to remedy its predecessor's liabilities;
specifically, would U.S. Pipe, as a bona fide purchaser, be compelled to
reinstate those wrongfully discharged workers with back pay from the
social affairs." Id. at 996. The authors note that restrictions on injunctive power
have become the butt of so many exceptions that the rules themselves are in doubt.
51. Cf. 2 L. Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATIONS 1004 (2d ed. 1961).
52. The usual remedies to compel inspection and prevent the injury complained of
include both mandamus and the injunction. H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS § 201, at 329 (1961). Some states allow mandamus only when public
interest is affected. The stockholder's normal remedy would be mandatory injunction.
Bregman v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 213 Ga. 561, 100 S.E.2d 267 (1957).
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date of the sale? The National Labor Relations Board answered that
question in the affirmative, holding that one who acquires and operates, in
a basically unchanged form, the business of an employer who had been
found guilty of unfair labor practices, under circumstances that charge
him with notice of the unfair practices of his predecessor, is liable to
remedy that predecessor's wrongful conduct. Perma Vinyl Corp., 2 LAB.
REL. REP. (65 L.R.R.M.) 1168 (NLRB May 24, 1967).
The Board's authority to bind successors and assigns by its orders
has been well settled ;1 however, the fundamental problem of whether the
respondent in a particular case qualified as a successor or assign2 has
perplexed the courts and the Board for a number of years.3 The Board
has had little difficulty when the transaction could be categorized as a
"disguised continuance of the old employer," 4 or when it could charac-
terize the transferee as the transferor's "alter ego." Thus, in each trans-
fer of ownership, the transferee's liability became contingent upon an
adjudication that the sale was in good faith.6 If the sale were labeled
bona fide, the purchaser escaped the obligation to rectify its seller's
wrongs; however, if it were determined that the motivation for the trans-
fer was the desire to evade the Board's remedial order, the responsibility
1. Regal Knitwear Co. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 9 (1945); NLRB v. Ozark Hard-
wood Co., 282 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1960) ; see NLRB v. Mastro Plastics Corp., 354 F.2d
170 (2d Cir. 1965), cert, denied, 384 U.S. 972 (1966).
2. See, e.g., NLRB v. Mastro Plastics Corp., 354 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 972 (1966), where the court stated that: "Whether a successor
corporation is liable is a question of fact which turns on whether, for example, it is
the alter ego ... or whether it has participated in an attempted evasion of obligations
imposed by the Board." Id. at 180, and 55 COLUM. L. Rtv. 405, 409 (1955), where
it is stated that:
Successors, for the purpose of unfair labor practice proceedings involving
transferee liability, have been defined as meaning those persons who continue
the business of the predecessor on the same premises without interruption or
substantial change in personnel or method of operation.
See NLRB v. Deena Artware, Inc., 361 U.S. 398 (1960).
3. Compare, e.g., NLRB v. Tempest Shirt Mfg. Co., 285 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1960)
NLRB v. Auto Ventshade, Inc., 276 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1960); NLRB v. New Madrid
Mfg. Co., 215 F.2d 908 (8th Cir. 1954) ; Atlanta Paper Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 125 (1958)
with, e.g., NLRB v. Alamo White Truck Serv., Inc., 273 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1959)
and NLRB v. Birdsall-Stockdale Motor Co., 208 F.2d 234 (10th Cir. 1953).
4. Southport Petroleum Co. v. NLRB, 315 U.S. 100, 106 (1942). See also
NLRB v. Weissman Co., 170 F.2d 952 (6th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 972
(1949).
5. Ozark Hardwood Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 1130 (1957), modified, 282 F.2d 1 (8th
Cir. 1960).
6. See NLRB v. Birdsall-Stockdale Motor Co., 208 F.2d 234 (10th Cir. 1953),
which suggested that because a bona fide purchaser was not a party to the unfair
practice, it could not be a successor. Consequently, any Board order directed at its
predecessor could not ipso facto affect the purchaser. The court reasoned that since
the requisite successor relationship was lacking, the buyer's liability could only be
based upon a finding that he had participated in an unfair practice. Since due process
demanded that a party charged with potential liability be afforded a hearing and an
opportunity to prepare a defense, the cause against the respondent-purchaser was
dismissed, for under this doctrine, a bona fide purchaser's refusal to remedy its seller's
labor wrongs was not itself an unfair practice unless that purchaser was a party
thereto. Id. at 237. See 55 COLUM. L. RIv. 405, 407 (1955). See generally NLRB v.
Parran, 237 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1956); NLRB v. Armato, 199 F.2d 800 (7th Cir.
1952); New England Tank Indus., Inc., 147 N.L.R.B. 598 (1964); Edward H.
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to repair the seller's unfair practices attached to the purchaser.7 Conse-
quently, the problem resolved into affixing the appropriate label.
8
The question before the Board in Perma Vinyl was not unique; it
had previously been considered in the 1954 case of Symns Grocer Co.9
There, the Board concluded that its powers were insufficient to bind the
purchaser with the task of rectifying its predecessor's unfair practices' 0
since an innocent good faith purchaser was not a successor." This
result left the victimized worker without a remedy.
12
However, the traditional definition of successor,13 which focused on
whether the transaction was bona fide, did not remain unchallenged.
Several circuits' 4 redefined that concept by concentrating on whether the
corporate identity remained basically unchanged subsequent to the transfer
of ownership. 15 This approach was ratified in 1964 whon the United
States Supreme Court decided John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston6 and
thereupon laid the semantic haggle to rest. The posture of successorship
ceased, said the Court, only upon proof of manifest lack of continuity in
7. NLRB v. Herman Bros. Pet Supply, Inc., 325 F.2d 68, 70 (6th Cir. 1963).
See also NLRB v. Deena Artware, Inc., 361 U.S. 398 (1960) ; Southport Petroleum
Co. v. NLRB, 315 U.S. 100, 106 (1942).
8. See, e.g., NLRB v. Herman Bros. Pet Supply, Inc., 325 F.2d 68 (6th Cir.
1963) ; NLRB v. McFarland, 306 F.2d 219 (10th Cir. 1962).
9. 109 N.L.R.B. 346 (1954).
10. Symns Grocer Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 346 (1954). In reaching this solution the
Board expressly reversed Alexander Milburn Co., 78 N.L.R.B. 747 (1947), which,
on the authority of Regal Knitwear Co. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 9 (1945), had concluded
that a bona fide purchaser was a successor, and, hence, subject to the same labor
obligations of its predecessor.
In Symns the Board followed NLRB v. Lunder Shoe Corp., 211 F.2d 284
(1st Cir. 1954) and NLRB v. Birdsall-Stockdale Motor Co., 208 F.2d 234 (10th Cir.
1953) and established the policy that unless the bona fide purchaser-successor was
adjudged guilty of unfair labor practices, the order to the predecessor could not be
enforced against the purchaser. See also note 6 supra.
11. See Birdsall-Stockdale Motor Co., 208 F.2d 234 (10th Cir. 1953); Great
Leopard Mkt. Corp., 150 N.L.R.B. 1384 (1965); Symns Grocer Co., 109 N.L.R.B.
346 (1954).
12. See Great Leopard Mkt. Corp., 150 N.L.R.B. 1384 (1965) ; Symns Grocer Co.,
109 N.L.R.B. 346 (1954) ; cf. NLRB v. Parran, 237 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1956) ; New
England Tank Indus., Inc., 147 N.L.R.B. 598 (1964); Edward H. McLaughlin,
135 N.L.R.B. 586 (1962).
13. See NLRB v. Malcolm Konner Chevrolet, Inc., 338 F.2d 972 (3d Cir. 1964)
NLRB v. Birdsall-Stockdale Motor Co., 208 F.2d 234 (10th Cir. 1953) ; Symns Grocer
Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 346 (1954). See also note 2 supra.
14. See NLRB v. C.C.C. Associates, 306 F.2d 534 (2d Cir. 1962) ; NLRB v.
McFarland, 306 F.2d 219 (10th Cir. 1962) ; NLRB v. Tempest Shirt Mfg. Co., 285
F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1960) ; NLRB v. Auto Ventshade, Inc., 276 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1960).
But see NLRB v. Alamo White Truck Serv., Inc., 273 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1959).
15. If the transfer operated to effect a basic change in the employing industry,
in the sense that the . . . operation of the predecessor became merged or inte-
grated into the larger business of Respondent so as to lose its identity, then the
bargaining unit is no longer appropriate and enforcement of the order should
be denied.
NLRB v. McFarland, 306 F.2d 219, 220 (10th Cir. 1962).
The mere fact that management or supervisory personnel have been replaced
does not render the violations they commit moot. . . . Accordingly, a remedial
order is still proper. With respect to the bargaining order, the designation of
the Union by a majority of the employees in the appropriate unit is still effective
regardless of the fact that the actual ownership of the stock ... has changed hands.
Dixie Highway Express, Inc., 153 N.L.R.B. 1224 n.2 (1965).
16. 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
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identity and similarity between the transferor and transferee.' 7 It is
noteworthy that nowhere in the opinion did the Court speak of good
or bad faith as a criterion for identifying the successor-predecessor rela-
tionship; substantial similarity was the key. To meet the Wiley stand-
ard a transferee disclaiming successor liability would have to establish
that the newly formed business was virtually unrecognizable from its
predecessor.' 8
Wiley's contribution to labor law was not limited to semantics. Its
paramount significance lay in the judicial recognition that the prerogative
of businessmen to rearrange their affairs had to be balanced against the
protection to be afforded employees affected by these sudden changes.,'
Thus, against the backdrop of Wiley's redirection in policy, Perma Vinyl
did not come as a surprise.
2 0
While the Board was mindful of the developing trend in the circuit
courts to redefine the successor concept, its opinion is' not merely a further
logical extension of that trend. Instead, the analysis is predicated upon the
same policy consideration expounded in Wiley. Hence, the Board declared:
Especially in need of help it seems to us, are the employee vic-
tims of unfair labor practices who, because of their unlawful dis-
charge, are now without meaningful remedy when title to the employ-
ing business operation changes hands.2'
Although Wiley's observation22 that workers should be buffered
against sudden changes in the employment relationship suggested the above
17. Id. at 551.
18. 60 Nw. U.L. Riy. 224, 229 (1965). But compare Piano Workers, Local 2549
v. W. W. Kimball Co., 333 F.2d 761 (7th Cir. 1964), rev'd per curiam, 379 U.S. 357
(1964) with McGuire v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 355 F.2d 352 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
384 U.S. 988 (1966).
Although the avenue of transfer in Wiley had been merger, that alone was
not crucial since both United Steelworkers v. Reliance Universal, Inc., 335 F.2d 891,
894 (3d Cir. 1964) and Wackenhut Corp. v. United Plant Guard Workers, 332 F.2d
954, 958 (9th Cir. 1964) held that the Wiley decision would have been the same had
the facts shown a transfer by sale rather than by merger. Cf. Overnight Transp. Co.
v. NLRB, 372 F.2d 765 (4th Cir. 1967).
The issue in Wiley as well as in both Wackenhut and Reliance Universal was
whether the transferee who succeeded to ownership by a bona fide transfer became
bound by its predecessor's collective bargaining agreement. Specifically, since the
respondent in Wiley refused to recognize the union as bargaining agent, the question
presented was whether the arbitration provision contained in that agreement survived
the merger. The Court decided that it did. 376 U.S. at 550.
For further analysis of John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, see The Supreme
Court, 1963 Term, 78 HARV. L. Rxv. 177, 285-88 (1964); 60 Nw. U.L. Rnv. 724
(1965) ; 1964 U. ILL. L.F. 847.
19. See notes 17-21 supra.
20. However, particularly influenced by the thinking reflected in more recent
Court decisions, we are persuaded that the Board's past restrictive view of its
remedial powers . . . should be reexamined.
2 LAR. RL. RtP. (65 L.R.R.M.) at 1168. See Birdsall-Stockdale Motor Co., 208
F.2d 234 (10th Cir. 1953); Morris & David Yoseph, 139 N.L.R.B. 1310 (1962);
Symns Grocer Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 346 (1954). See also notes 6 and 18 supra.
21. 2 LAD. RrL. RzP. (65 L.R.R.M.) at 1168.
22. Employees . . . ordinarily do not take part in negotiations leading to a
change in corporate ownership. The negotiations will ordinarily not concern the
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declaration, the problem before the Supreme Court was fundamentally
different from that faced by the Board in the present case. The issue in-
volved in Wiley was whether the assignor's contractual duty to arbitrate
survived the assignment. This should be contrasted with the problem of
whether liability for infractions of public law survives the bona fide trans-
fer of ownership. Without mention of this variance, the Board indicated
that it intends to protect both with equal vigor. This result is sound, for
while the rights guaranteed by a labor contract are often greater than those
granted statutorily, the difference is one of degree and is not significant
enough to justify the preservation of the former and the denial of the
jatter.
The imposition of liability23 upon the transferee in all situations
except where it succeeds in demonstrating that the resulting business is
unrecognizable from the transferor's, required that the Board balance
several interests. On one hand was the consideration that the purchaser
was not a party to its seller's wrongdoings. 24 Similarly, the Board weighed
the possible economic distress that would visit a buyer if he were declared
liable.25 On the other hand, however, was the realization that the victims
of the labor wrongs had no other effective recourse.
20
In order to resolve this dilemma the Board reviewed the policy of the
National Labor Relations Act,27 concluding that the Act sought to advance
industrial peace by directing its corrective and remedial provisions not at
the owner of the corporation, but at the employing corporate entity
itself.28 Thus, with Wiley's policy and its endorsed definition of "succes-
will inevitably be incidental to the main considerations. The objectives of national
labor policy, reflected in established principles of federal law, require that the
rightful prerogative of owners independently to rearrange their businesses and
even eliminate themselves as employers be balanced by some protection to the
employees from a sudden change in the employment relationship.
376 U.S. at 549.
23. We find this authority in the Act's delegation of broad administrative power
to the Board to frame such remedial orders "as will effectuate the policies of
the Act." . . . [T]he Board is not .. . restricted to requiring remedial action
by the offending employer alone; hence its orders run to such employer's suc-
cessors and assigns ...
2 LAB. RL. Rnp. (65 L.R.R.M.) at 1168-69. See generally Regal Knitwear Co. v.
NLRB, 324 U.S. 9 (1945).
24. See note 6 supra.
25. In the instant case the Board made a special exception for U.S. Pipe which
lessened its obligations.
With respect to U.S. Pipe, at the time of its takeover of Perma Vinyl's
business, Board law imposed no obligation upon it to take any action regarding
the unremedied unfair labor practices of its predecessor. We believe it would
be inequitable now to require of it the full remedial action which we believe
needs to be taken in the appropriate case by successors like it if the policies of
the Act are to be meaningfully effectuated.
2 LAB. RFL. Rtp. (65 L.R.R.M.) at 1170 (emphasis added).
26. See p. 234 & note 12 supra.
27. 49 Stat. §§ 449-57 (1935), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1964).
28. NLRB v. Colten, 105 F.2d 179, 183 (6th Cir. 1939). The question there
presented was whether the Board's cease and desist order remained in force against
the successor to the offending partnership which committed the unfair practices. The
newly created establishment contended that the order was ineffective against it. The
Board, however, held that the concern would have to abide by the order because the
Act was directed to the whole employment complex in an operation and not merely
the employer. Id. at 183.
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sor"29 coloring the NLRA's focus on the employing industry,30 the
finding that U.S. Pipe continued to operate the facilities at Perma Vinyl
without substantial change while employing the same personnel, 31 and
the realization that the by-product of the transfer of corporate ownership
included certain wronged employees, the Board felt constrained to inter-
vene to assure the wronged employees that their statutory rights, like
their contractual equivalents, were not illusory.3 2 Since the Board was
concerned with both resolving a real problem and balancing the equities
in the process, it avoided, and hence did not become distracted by, the
semantic difficulties that befell Symns and the cases which preceded it. 33
Here, the utilization of Wiley's workable definition of "successor" enabled
the Board to ignore the immaterial question of good faith and to proceed
with the real task of fashioning a remedy for the previously unprotected
employees.
By requiring that the successor stand in the posture of its predecessor,
the Board not only guaranteed recourse to the employee, but also, indi-
rectly, required that the primary obligation of compensating the victim
of the unfair practice be assumed by the perpetrator of that wrongful
act. Thus, in view of the strong presumption that a purchaser-employer
is aware of its seller's labor ills, 34 the Board observed that the purchase
price would vary inversely with the degree of potential liability under-
taken by the successor.35  Moreover, any miscalculation in that mathe-
matical relationship could be corrected by the inclusion of an indemnity
clause in the sales agreement.3 6 In effect, the Board has decreed that
henceforth the purchaser's status will be that of a surety.37
The consequences of the instant decision are more pervasive than
the simple reversal of Symns. It is significant that its rationale was predi-
cated on the policy that the well-being of employees should be protected
from adverse changes in the industrial complex precipitated by business
transactions that ignored the worker. Hereinafter, contractual rights and
29. See pp. 234-35 & notes 15-18 supra.
30. The term "employing industry" is taken from NLRB v. Colten, 105 F.2d 179,
183 (6th Cir. 1939). While the term is not without ambiguity, it evidently refers to
the corporate entity as opposed to the owners of the industrial assets.
We regard the employee-employer relationship as a most important element
in determining whether there is sufficient continuity between two employing
enterprises to justify enforcing an NLRB order against a company that was not
a party to the original proceeding ...
NLRB v. Alamo White Truck Serv., Inc., 273 F.2d 238, 242 (5th Cir. 1959). See
also Johnson Ready Mix Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 437, 442 (1963).
31. 2 LAB. REL. RxP. (65 L.R.R.M.) at 1168.
32. Id. at 1169.
33. E.g., Alexander Milburn Co., 78 N.L.R.B. 747 (1947). Cf. Great Leopard
Mkt. Corp., 150 N.L.R.B. 1384 (1965) ; Symns Grocer Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 346 (1954).
34. See 78 HARV. L. Rev. 285, 288 (1964).
35. 2 LAB. R4L. REP. (65 L.R.R.M.) at 1169.
36. Id.
37. The purchaser will effectively assume the position of a surety by virtue of
the Board's finding of joint and several liability of the purchaser and seller and its
observation that a prudent transferee will require indemnity against possible suc-
cessor liability. Therefore, the purchaser will sustain liability only in those cases
where he fails to require an indemnity clause or where he has obtained the clause and
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statutory rights will be assured protection. In addition, Perma Vinyl
succeeded in halting an illogical, dualistic growth in this area of successor
liability. Although the law had been well settled that the bona fide pur-
chaser-successor was required to comply with a National Labor Relations
Board union certification order which had been directed to its predeces-
sor,88 prior to Perma Vinyl, that same type of successor, much to the dis-
may of the wronged employees, was generally free to disregard an order
to reinstate improperly dismissed employees.89 Ostensibly, both situations
depended upon the successor concept; however, while the former resolved
into an analysis of whether substantial continuity of identity existed,
40
the latter had been resolved by the implementation of the well-worn good
faith concept.41 This confusion, fortunately, was eliminated by Perma
Vinyl which, when analyzing the aforementioned reinstatement ques-
tion, focused on the substantially unchanged character of the corporate
entity that survived the transfer, rather than on notions of good faith.
In the final analysis, the solution announced in Perma Vinyl is both
sound and enlightening. Its consonance with the policy set forth in Wiley
cannot be questioned. Secondly, it has correctly extracted the issue of
good faith from this area and replaced it with a more workable standard.
Finally, the decision ended the illogical duality which had developed
in the related areas of union certification and employee reinstatement
proceedings. Nevertheless, this adjudication may prove distressing to the
business community, for it has made it incumbent upon a would-be
purchaser to either obtain an indemnity clause from its seller, or establish
that the resultant business is virtually unrecognizable from its predeces-
sor.4 2 Also, notwithstanding the presence of an indemnity agreement,
there is no absolute guarantee that the successor will be saved harmless,
for in the event that its seller is insolvent or otherwise immune, liability
will attach. Moreover, Perma Vinyl's seemingly strong policy commit-
ment to protect the employee's right to recourse for labor wrongs from
being precluded by a business transfer suggests that the purchaser who
either fails to require an indemnity agreement, or who finds himself
saddled with liability notwithstanding such an agreement, will be hard-
pressed to meet the "virtually unrecognizable" standard. This, therefore,
introduces what should be the next development in this area; where
should a wronged employee look when the resulting operation is in fact
unrecognizable from its predecessor?
William E. Benner
38. M. Eskin & Son, 148 N.L.R.B. 1022, 1030-33 (1964); see NLRB v. McFar-
land, 306 F.2d 219 (10th Cir. 1962) ; NLRB v. Auto Ventshade, Inc., 276 F.2d 303
(5th Cir. 1960) ; NLRB v. Armato, 199 F.2d 800 (7th Cir. 1952) ; Rohlik, Inc., 145
N.L.R.B. 1236 (1964); Johnson Ready Mix Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 437 (1963).
39. M. Eskin & Son, 148 N.L.R.B. 1022, 1030-33 (1964); Morris & David
Yoseph, 139 N.L.R.B. 1310, 1314 (1962). But see NLRB v. Tempest Shirt Mfg. Co.,
285 F.2d 1, 4 (5th Cir. 1960).
40, See note 38 supra.
41. M. Eskin & Son, 148 N.L.R.B. 1022, 1030-33 (1964).
42. See p. 235 & note 18 supra.
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